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This dissertation focus is the analysis of a possible merger of two wind turbine manufacturers, 
Vestas and Gamesa. The proposed deal will have has business background the trend for market 
consolidation, as well the down trend of both firms market share and market value, being the wind 
power sector still with attractive prospects,. 
 
For this proposal, it is combined a deep industry and company analysis with the state of the art 
valuation tools. Literature on Valuation and M&A is reviewed and applied to evaluate the 
standalone and merged businesses, proposing an optimal transaction structure.  
 
The whole analysis relies on data until end of 2011, being performed estimated for both companies’ 
standalone and the combined firm, for a growth and stable period. Data from comparables and 
market benchmarks where also collected for different tools usage. 
 
The merged firm with synergies will generate a high increase in the equity value. Net synergies are 
estimated to be around 67% attributable to Vestas and 33% to Gamesa in the combined firm value. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the deal will create a sustainable value both firms’ shareholders by 
issuing a new leading company. 
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PREFACE 
 
Concluding this dissertation with success was defined as a goal after finishing the Master in 
Finance program, aiming the enlargement of my Finance skills. M&A area, by the large scope of 
work involved, addresses a mix of two very close and related areas, Business and Finance, always 
being part of my career.  
 
I would like to express my acknowledgements especially to Professor Peter Tsvetkov for important 
advisory support and dedication crucial for the dissertation finish accomplishment.  
 
I am especially grateful for the confidence and enthusiasm transmitted by my “always present 
colleague in this journey”, keeping me focused and motivated until the very last moment and to my 
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1 – LITERATURE REVIEW ON VALUATION 
 
1.1 – Overview on Valuation 
 
In the field of Valuation we find a wide spectrum of models, from the simple to the most 
sophisticated ones, making several assumptions about the path to determine value, sharing some 
common characteristics. According to Damodaran (2006), this classification provides several 
advantages, by making easier to understand where individual models fit in to the big picture, why 
hey provide different results and when they have fundamental errors in logic.  
 
Fernandez (2007) classifies the methods for valuing companies in six groups: Balance Sheet, 
Income Statement, Mixed (Goodwill), Cash Flow Discounting, Value Creation, Options. 
 
The four main groups of company valuation methods most widely used are: 
 
Valuation Method Remarks 
Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
Relates the value of an asset to the present value of 
expected future cash flows on that asset. 
Liquidation and Accounting Valuation 
Built around valuing the assets of a firm, with accounting 
estimates of a value or book value often used as a 
starting point. 
Relative Valuation 
Estimates the value of an asset by looking at the pricing 
of “comparable” assets relative to a common variable 
like earnings, cash flows, book value or sales. 
Contingent Claim Valuation 
Uses option pricing models to measure the value of 
assets that share option characteristics. This is what 
generally falls under the topic of real options. 
 
Fernandez (2007) states that the most suitable method for valuing a company is to discount the 
expected future cash flows, as the value of a company arises from the company’s capacity to 








Merger between Vestas and Gamesa 
Page 6  99 
 
 
1.2 – Discounted Cash Flow Valuation (DCF) 
 
1.2.1 – Basic Concepts 
 
In DCF valuation, the value of company is the present value of its expected cash flows, discounted 




















n = Life of the asset 
CFt = Cash flow in period t 
r = Discount rate reflecting the riskness of the estimated cash flows 
 
Due to the importance of the Residual Value or Terminal Value to a company’s valuation, this will 
be subject to discussion in a specific topic of this section. 
 
Damodaran (2006) also states that, beside the above described risk-adjusted discount rate DCF 
approach we can find other ones like certainty equivalent cash flow, adjusted present value and 
excess return. Also states that the risk-adjusted discount rate is the most common one, which will 
be our focus. 
 
The process of valuing a company with the DCF (Steiger, 2008), contains different stages. In the 
first stage scenarios are developed to predict future cash flows for a certain period. Since the DCF 
method is a valuation technique that is based on predictions, a scenario analysis is usually 
conducted to examine the effects of changes in the underlying assumptions. That’s why 
Damodaran (2006) states that using cash flow models are in some sense an act of faith. 
 
Deriving the NPV of these free cash flows that accrue in the scenario analysis is very complex, 
because all these cash flows are based on assumptions (Steiger, 2008). To provide a detailed view 
on how the company’s value might be affected by a change in the underlying assumptions, a 
sensitivity analysis is usually conducted.  
 
The most important scenario in valuation of a company is the base case. In this sense, the 
prediction regarding the future development of the company, its relevant markets and competitors 
are used to build the scenario that is most likely to happen. That’s why the topic of Industry and 
Company Review is crucial in this sense.  
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However, is important to pay attention to the reliability of any figures coming from the management, 
being often a personal incentive to increase the take over price and therefore might provide biased 
estimates. 
 
1.2.2 – Estimating Cash Flows 
 
The different methods of calculating value by DCF, depends on the type of cash flow that we take 
into account. We can consider the following inputs: 
 
- Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) – is the operating cash flow, that is the cash flow 
generated by operations, without taking into account borrowing (financial debt), after tax. It 
is the money that would be available in the company after covering fixed asset investment 
and working capital requirements, assuming that there is no debt and, therefore, there are 
no financial expenses. 
 
Damodaran (2006) expresses a formula that captures the above descriptions: 
 
FCFF = After-tax Operating Income – (Capital Expenditure – Depreciation) – Change in 
non-cash Working Capital 
 
- Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) – is the cash available to equity investors. Is calculated 
by subtracting from the free cash flow to the firm the interest and principal payments (after 
tax) made in each period to the debt holders and adding the new debt provided. In short, it 
is the cash flow remaining available in the company after covering fixed assets investments 
and working capital requirements and after paying the financial charges and repaying the 
corresponding part of the debt’s principal. 
 
Damodaran (1994) expresses a way to measure FCFE that capture the above descriptions: 
 
FCFE = Net Income + Depreciation – Capital Expenditures – Change in non-cash Working 
Capital – (New Debt Issued – Debt repayments) 
  
In certain conditions, dividends can also be considered as a sort of equity cash flow. In this 
sense, the Dividend Discount Model (DDM) could be applied using this equity cash flow. At 
the end, dividend represents the only cash flow from the firm that it’s tangible to investors. 
Estimates of FCFE and FCFF remain estimates and conservative investors can reasonably 
argue that they cannot lay claim on these cash flows. 
 
However, in the last years we observe firms choosing to hold back cash that they can pay 
out to shareholders, as well the increasing of stock buybacks usage as a way of returning 
cash to stockholders. In deed, the DDM as become decreasingly used although the method 
does have its proponents with recognized advantages. 
 
- Capital Cash Flow (CCF) – is the term given to the sum of the debt cash flow plus the 
equity cash flow. 
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1.2.3 - Appropriate Discount Rate vs. Type of Cash Flows 
 
According to Fernandez (2009), there are four basic cash flow valuation methods, relating the 
above described cash flows and their appropriate discount rate: 
 
1) From the FCFF and the WACC (Weighted Average Cost of Capital) 
 
The Value of the Debt (D) plus the Value of the Equity (E) is the present value of the expected 
free cash flows (FCF), discounted at the weighted average cost of capital (WACC): 
 
[2] [ ]tt FCFWACCPVDE ;000 =+  
 
The definition of WACCt is: 
 




Ke = required return on the equity flows; 
Kd = required return on the debt flows (cost of debt); 
T = corporate tax rate; 
 
Et-1 and Dt-1 are the values obtained in the valuation using formula [2]. Consequently, the 
valuation is an interactive process: the FCF are discounted at the WACC to calculate the firm’s 
value (E+D), but the firm’s value (E+D) is needed to obtain the WACC. We will return to the 
cost of capital subject in a specific topic of this section. 
 
 
2) From the FCFE and the required return on the firm’s equity flows (Ke) 
 
The value of Equity (E) is the present value of the expected cash flows for equity holders (CFe) 
discounted at the required return on the firm’s equity flows (Ke): 
 
[4] [ ]tt CFeKePVE ;00 =  
 
The value of Debt (D) is the present value of the expected cash flows for the debt (CFd) 
discounted at the required return on the debt (kd): 
 
[5] [ ]tt CFdKdPVD ;00 =  
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[6] ( )TIDFCFCFe tttt −−∆+= 1  
Where,  
tD∆ = increase in debt;  
tI = interest paid by the firm; 
CFd = tt DI ∆−  
 
The sum of the values provided [4] and [5] is identical to the value provided by [2]. In fact, the 
WACC is the rate at which the FCF must be discounted to obtain the result given by [4] and [5]. 
 
[7] [ ] [ ] [ ]tttttt CFdKdPVCFeKePVFCFWACCPVDE ;;; 00000 +==+  
 
3) From the CCF and the WACCBT (Weighted Average Cost of Capital before Taxes) 
 
The capital cash flows are the cash flows for all of the firm’s stakeholders (Debt and Equity), 
and are equivalent to the cash flow for shareholders (CFe) plus the cash flow for the debt 
holders (CFd) (Fernandez, 2008). 
 
The following formula indicates that the value of debt today (D) plus the value of equity (E) is 
equal to the capital cash flow (CCF) discounted at weighted cost of debt and equity before 
taxes (WACCBT): 
 
[8] [ ]ttBT CCFWACCPVDE ;00 =+  
 
The definition of WACCBT is: 
 
[9] [ ] [ ]11111 / −−−−− ++= ttttttBT DEKdDKeEWACC t  
 
The above expression is obtained by equaling [2] with [8]. 
 
WACCBT represents the discount rate that insures that the value of the firm obtained with both 
expressions is the same. In deed, one way of defining WACCBT is: rate at which the CCF must 
be discounted to obtain the result given by [4] and [5]: 
 
[10] [ ] [ ]ttttBT FCFWACCPVCCFWACCPVDE ;;00 ==+  
 
      The expression that related the CCF with CFe and with the FCF is: 
 
       [11] TIFCFIDCFeCFdCFeCCF tttttttt +=+∆−=+=  
 
Where,  
                                                 
1 Free cash flow is the cash flow for equity holders in the hypothetical unlevered firm.  
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       tD∆ = 1−− tt DD  
      ttt KdDI 1−=  
 
 
        
4) The Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
 
The formula below indicates that the value of debt (D) plus that of the equity (E) of the levered firm 
is equal to the value of unlevered firm’s equity (Vu) plus the NPV of the tax savings due to payment 
of interest (VTS): 
 
[12] oVTSVuDE +=+ 000  
 
[13] [ ]tt FCFKuPVVu ;00 =  
Where, 
Ku = required return on the firms unlevered flows (or required return on the asset flows). Combining 
the two above formulas: 
 
[14] [ ] [ ]tttt FCFKuPVFCFWACCPVVuDEVTS ;; 000000 −=−+=  
 
The four approaches described above always have the same output in terms of value for the firm, if 
they are used properly, for any type of forecast (Fernandez, 2008).  
 
There is disagreement among various authors regarding the calculation of the Adjusted Present 
Value (APV): a number of theories exist about the size of Value of Tax Shields (VTS). The size of 
the VTS has implications for the valuation and affects:  
 
- The value of equity (E) and debt of the firm (E+D); 
- The relationship between the required return on asset flows (Ku) and the required return on 
equity flows in the levered firm (ke); 
- The relationship between the WACC and the required return on the asset flows (Ku). 
 
1.2.4 - The Discount Rate 
 
From the topic above we can summarize the relationship between DCF methods and discount rate 
as follows: 
 
Relation between DCF methods and discount rate 
DCF Methods Appropriate Discount Rate Inputs 
FCFF WACC 
Cost of levered equity (Ke) 
and cost of Debt (Kd) 
FCFE Ke Cost of levered equity  
APV Ku Cost of unlevered equity  
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The most widely used asset pricing model is still the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
2
 
(Goedhart et al. 2005a), with a large majority of the firms using it to estimate the cost of equity 
(Damodaran, 2002). The CAPM reveals the return that investors require for bearing the risk of 
holding a company’s share. This required return is the return on equity that investors demand to 
bear risk of holding the company’s share and is, therefore, equivalent to the company’s cost of 
equity, which can be expressed by the following formula (Ross, Westerfield, Jordan, 2005): 
 
[15] )( RfRmRfKe L −+= β  
 
Where, (Rm-Rf) is commonly referred as the MRP (Market Risk Premium) 
 
In this sense, CAPM reaches the required return on equity by answering 2 main questions: 
 
1. What return would this investment be required to yield, if it was risk-free? 
2. In case it is actually not risk-free, how much additional return should be required? 
 
Damodaran (2008) provides a good framework for deciding on which rate to use. In his own words, 
“risk in finance is viewed in terms of the variance in actual returns around the expected return”.  
 
Nevertheless, there are two conditions to be verified in a risk-free rate: no default risk and no 
reinvestment risk. Respecting both conditions leaves any zero-coupon government bond with 
maturity similar to our investment’s duration as the best Rf estimate. 
 
The risk-free investment realizes returns that are exactly equal to those expected, for a time horizon 
similar to that of our equity investment. Damodaran (2008) states that for mature companies (a 
study on S&P500), duration for an average firm’s equity is around 8 years, approximately the same 
as a 10-year treasury bond. 
 
The other parameter, the equity risk premium, should be the future excess return one expects from 
an investment in the market portfolio, above the risk-free rate. 
 
The risk premium demanded by an investor depends on a variety of factors that are difficult to 
translate into a number. Yet, Lettau et al. (2008) prove that economic risk (uncertainty about future 
economic conditions, translated in volatility of real GDP) plays a major role. Thus, any analyst that 
can access reliable GDP growth expectations should try to incorporate those into his analysis. 
Surveying investors about the premium they apply has proved to have weak prediction power 
(Damodaran, 2010). Implied risk premiums in current dividend yields are conceptually appealing, 
but one cannot rely on it when there is no consensus about future cash flows. 
 
                                                 
2 The model was introduced by Jack Treynor (1961, 1962), William Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965) and Jan Mossin 
(1966) independently, building on the earlier work of Harry Markowitz on diversification and modern portfolio theory. The 
model is used to determine a theoretically appropriate required rate of return of an asset, if that asset is to be added to an 
already well-diversified portfolio, given that asset's non-diversifiable risk. 
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Risk premium is still a controversial issue over which academics don’t agree. However, tracing 
historical returns on an equity index is generally an acceptable approach. For global firms (global 
operations and investors), which is the case of the considered companies in the proposed 
transactions, picking a global equity index rather than a domestic one may make sense. 
 
To analyze exposure to market risk, there is the Beta (β). The β parameter measures the volatility, 
or systematic risk, of a stock or portfolio in comparison to the market as a whole. To calculate the 
Beta of a stock, returns on the stock should be regressed against returns on an equity index 
representing the market portfolio. The time frame to be covered by the regression could range from 
3 to 10 years - the longer the better, as long as the firm hasn’t gone through any significant 
changes in its business mix and leverage over that period (Damodaran, 2002). The author also 
states that monthly returns minimize the bias on our data. The formula of calculating this parameter 












Both business risk and financial leverage affect a firm’s equity Beta.  
 
As mentioned previously, depending on the valuation model, we need the unlevered cost of equity 
(or cost of assets, Ku), or the levered cost of equity (Ke). When a Beta is estimated through a 
regression of a firm’s stock against an index, we get Beta for the levered company, i.e. the Equity 
Beta of the firm given the observed leverage. 
An accurate beta for a firm, if not directly regressed, could be obtained from adjusting industry 
betas or peer betas to the firm’s capital structure. Betas can be unlevered and relevered to suit any 




























In result we can compute the unlevered cost of equity (Ku) using the following expression: 
 
[19] )( RfRmRfKu U −+= β  
 
The final input, to complete all the required ones to estimate the appropriate discount rate is the 
cost of debt. The cost of debt (Kd) is the required return on a firm’s debt, as if it was refinanced 
today. Specifically, Kd could be estimated by observing the yields at which the firm’s bonds are 
trading, or summing up a risk-free rate and a spread based on Rating Agencies’ tables (like 
Moody’s or S&P), which rely on interest coverage ratios and indicators alike. 
 
1.2.5 - Misconceptions and errors in WACC 
 
According to Fernandez (2011), the WACC is just the rate at which the FCFs must be discounted to 
obtain the same result as the valuation using ECFs. WACC is neither a cost not a required return: it 
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is a weighted average of a cost and a required return. To refer to the WACC as the “cost of capital” 
may be misleading because it is not a cost.  
 
Some errors can occur by not remembering the definition of WACC. Also must be taken into 
account the relationship between the WACC and the VTS. The WACC is a discount rate widely 
used in corporate finance. However the correct calculation of the WACC rests on a correct valuation 
of the tax shields. The VTS depends on the debt policy of the company. When the debt level is 
fixed, the tax shields should be discounted at the required return to debt. If the leverage ratio is 

















g = rate of growing perpetuity 
 
Other debt policies should be explored. For example, Fernandez (2007) develops valuation formula 
for the situation in which the leverage ratio is fixed at book values and argues that it is more realistic 
to assume that a company maintains a fixed book leverage ratio than to assume, as Miles and 
Ezzel do. 
 
1.2.6 - Terminal Value 
 
When evaluating a company using the DCF method, Terminal Value can be a key factor that might 
highly influence the final result. The reasonableness of this final economic valuation may be 
doubtful if Terminal Value is a back box whose contents are unclear. 
 
The purpose of Terminal Value is to give a reasonable estimate of the economic value of the 
company in a given year, n, at which point annual forecasts cease to be given. This value will 
depend on the envisaged future scenario. For example, if it is considered reasonable that the 
business be wound up in a year n, the Terminal Value should be the liquidation value, net of tax. If 
the company is being valued as a going concern, the economic value may be estimated from 
market data (extrinsic value) or based on company fundamentals (intrinsic value).  
 
Estimating Terminal Value using an extensive value is simply a matter of using a multiple for which 
it is assumed the company can be sold in year n. Terminal Value is frequently estimated in the form 
of an intrinsic value calculated by extrapolating from a baseline FCF. 
 
A publicly traded firm potentially has an infinite life. The value is therefore the present value of cash 
flows forever. Since we can not estimate cash flows forever, we estimate cash flows for a “growth 
period” and then estimate a Terminal Value, to capture the value at the end of the period. 
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[21] 


















When a firm’s cash flows grow at a “constant” rate forever, the present value of those cash flows 
can be written as: 
 




r = discount rate (cost of equity or cost of capital); 
g = expected growth rate 
 
In short, when using the DCF method to estimate Terminal Value it is necessary to give a 
reasonable estimate of three variables: 
 
• the rate of growth of the FCF, g; 
• the period considered; 
• the baseline FCF from which the extrapolation is calculated. 
 
Damodaran (2002) states that, when looking at the FCFF, the expected growth rate can be 
expressed as:  
 
[23] Capital on Return x Rate ntReinvestme  Rate Growth Expected =  
 
Where, 
Reinvestment Rate =  
(Capital Expenditure – Depreciation + Investment in Working Capital)/ (EBIT x (1-T)) 
 
[24]  Return on Capital = (EBIT x (1-T)) / Capital invested 
 
However, the reasonableness of the growth rate, g, is often associated with the period considered. 
An infinite period is often used, and a growth rate which does not exceed real GDP growth.  
 
The baseline FCF for the extrapolation must be consistent with the value we want to estimate. It is 
not appropriate to use the last year’s FCF as it may not be representative of the future to perpetuity 
that the residual value needs to reflect. It’s necessary to analyse the three components of FCF: (i) 
FCF from operations; (ii) FCF from needs of operational working capital; (iii) FCF from investments 
and divestments in fixed assets. 
 
In scenarios where the business is expected to continue indefinitely it is often to check that the 
forecast value of ROCE is not much higher than that of WACC. Mature businesses usually have 
levels of profitability which do not exceed the cost of their resources. 
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The FCF used as the baseline in order to extrapolate an estimate of the Terminal Value must also 
include an investment in working capital and in fixed assets, as it is not reasonable to assume that 
a company may continue indefinitely as a going concern without making investments. 
 
 
In order to prevent Terminal Value from turning into a back box that could be used to justify any 
economic value, regardless of whether it is reasonable, it is necessary to understand what Terminal 
Value is supposed to show and how it is estimated. 
 
In the case of a valuation based on DCF, to analyse the reasonableness of the Terminal Value 
used, it is necessary to make a reasonable estimate of the main economic value generators: the 
period of time, the growth rate, and the baseline FCF from which the extrapolation will be made. 
 
1.3 – The Multiples in Valuation 
 
Although most authors of textbooks affirm the importance of the multiples valuation method in 
practice, along with its usefulness in supporting more complex valuations, they do not provide a 
“functional manual”. Therefore, some practitioners suggest that the selection of comparable firms 
and multiples is essentially an art form, which should be left for professionals. Yet the degree of 
subjectivity involved in their application is awkward from a scientific point of view (Bhojraj and Lee, 
2002). 
 
From the valuation accuracy of the multiples valuation method, several studies compare this 
approach to fundamental equity valuation models. Kaplan & Kuback (1995 and 1996) while 
conclude that DCF valuations approximate transaction values reasonably well, they also find that 
simple enterprise value to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
(EV/EBIDTA) multiples result in similar valuation accuracy. Richter (2005) presents a theoretical 
approach on how to link multiples to the DCF model. His approach is based on the fact that 
multiples consolidate specific information of a firm’s key value drovers (i.e., profitability, growth, and 
risk) which is also processed in the DCF valuation formula.  
 
Based on Mckinsey, 2005, the principles for “well tempered multiples” are: 
 
1. Peer with similar prospects for ROIC and growth 
To choose the right companies, we have to match those with similar expectations for 
growth and ROIC.  
 
Arzac (2005) and Koller, Goedhart & Wessels (2005) concentrate on the development of 
criteria for the identification of comparable firms. In an ideal world, comparable firms have 
the same operating and financial characteristics as the firm being valued. However, even in 
finely defined industries, “true” comparables are not always available. Koller, Goedhart & 
Wessels (2005), therefore, suggest collecting a list of firms based on the finest available 
industry first, and then further shortening this list by excluding firms with different 
prospecting of profitability and growth compared to the target firm. 
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In a similar context, the market for corporate transactions offers the opportunity to construct 
a peer group based on comparable transactions and therewith investigate the properties 
and valuation accuracy of transaction multiples. One of the major drawbacks of this 
approach is the difficulty of finding “comparable transactions”, as well some industry are not 
so dynamic in terms of deals to catch relevant and useful data to apply this kind of 
multiples. 
 
2. Forward-looking multiples 
 
Empirical evidence shows that forward-looking multiples are more accurate predictors of 
value. Liu, Nissim, and Thomas (2000) compared the characteristics and performance of 
historical and forward industry multiples for a subset of companies trading on the NYSE, the 
American Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq. When they compared individual companies 
against their industry mean, the dispersion of historical earnings-to-price (E/P) ratios was 
nearly twice that of one-year forward E/P ratios. The three also found that forward-looking 
multiples promoted greater accuracy in pricing. 
 
3. Enterprise-value multiples 
 
Although widely used, P/E multiples have two major flaws. First, they are systematically 
affected by capital structure. For companies whose unlevered P/E (the ratio they would 
have if entirely financed by equity) is greater than one over the cost of debt, P/E ratios rise 
with leverage. Thus, a company with a relatively high all-equity P/E can artificially increase 
its P/E ratio by swapping debt for equity. Second, the P/E ratio is based on earnings, which 
include many non-operating items, such as restructuring charges and write-offs. Since 
these are often one-time events, multiples based on P/E can be misleading.  
 
One alternative to the P/E ratio is the ratio of enterprise value to EBITA. In general, this 
ratio is less susceptible to manipulation by changes in capital structure. Since enterprise 
value includes both debt and equity, and EBITA is the profit available to investors, a change 
in capital structure will have no systematic effect. Only when such a change lowers the cost 
of capital will changes lead to a higher multiple. Even so, don’t forget that enterprise-value-
to-EBITA multiples still depend on ROIC and growth. 
 
4. Adjust the enterprise-value-to-EBITA multiple for non-operating items 
 
Although the one-time non-operating items in net income make EBITA superior to earnings 
for calculating multiples, even enterprise-value-to-EBITA multiples must be adjusted for 
non-operating items hidden within enterprise value and EBITA, both of which must be 
adjusted for these non-operating items, such as excess cash and operating leases. Failing 
to do so can generate misleading results. 
 
A properly executed multiples analysis can make financial forecasts more accurate. Any 
analysis, however, is only as accurate as the forecasts it relies on.  
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Of the available valuation tools, a discounted-cash-flow analysis delivers the best results. Yet a 
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1.4 – Steps in DCF based Valuation 
 
In the figure below, which contain a summary of this topic, being somewhat of a guideline for the 
valuation of each stand alone company involved on the proposed transaction of this thesis, aiming 
to serve as guideline for the valuation works in the next sections.  
 
Basic Stages in the performance of a valuation using DCF 
 
Financial Analysis Strategic and Competitive analysis
Evolution of Income Statements and Balance Sheets Evolution of the industry
Evolution of the Cash Flows generated by the company Evolution of the company's competitive position
Evolution of the company's investments Identification of the Value Chain
Evolution of the company's financing Competitive position of the main competitors
Analysis of the financial health Identification of the Value Drivers
Analysis of the business's risk
Financial Forecasts Strategic and competitive forecasts
Income Statements and Balance Sheets Forecast of the industry's evolution
Cash Flows generated by the company Forecast of the company's competitive position
Investments Competitive position of the main competitors
Financing Consitency of the cash flow forecasts
Terminal Value Financial consistency between forecasts
Forecast of various scenarios Comparison of forecasts with historical figures
Consistency of cash flows with the strategic analysis
Net present value as their corresponding rate
Present Value of the Terminal Value
Value of the Equity
Strategic and competitive justification of the value creation
For each business unit and for the company as a whole
Cost of the debt, required return to equity and weighted cost of capital
PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE FLOWS
HISTORIC AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE COMPANY AND THE INDUSTRY
Indentification of the value creation. Sustainability of the value creation (time horizon)
Analysis of the value's sensitivity to changes in the fundamental parameters
Benchmarking of the value obtained: comparison with similar companies
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
NET PRESENT VALUE OF FUTURE FLOWS
DETERMINATION OF THE COST (Required Return) OF CAPITAL
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In resume the following steps that will be followed, considering a horizontal merger: 
 
a) Value both companies standalone; 
 
b) Value the combined firm with no synergies; 
 
c) Value the combined firm with synergy built in by adjusting DCF ingredients in the merged 
valuation model. 
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2 – LITERATURE REVIEW ON M&A 
 
2.1 – Definitions 
 
As stated by Nakamura (2005), M&A can be explained by a broad definition, which could lead to 
confusion and misunderstanding as it entails everything from pure mergers to strategic alliances. 
This thesis follows the concept of M&A in a narrow sense, which classifies M&A as stated below: 
 
- Mergers as the combination of two or more companies in creation of a new entity or 
formation of a holding company (European Central Bank, 2000, Gaughan, 2002, Jagersma, 
2005); 
- Acquisitions as the purchase of shares or assets on another company to achieve a 
managerial influence/control (European Central Bank, 2000, Chunlai and Findlay, 2003), 
not necessarily by mutual agreement (Jagersma, 2005). 
 
Our focus on this work will be a merger. Mergers are commonly referred as either merger by 
absorption or establishment (Chen and Findlay, 2003). Merger by absorption is the situation in 
which one company buys all stocks of one or more companies, and the absorbed companies cease 
to exist whereas merger by establishment refers to the case where two or more firms are merged 
into a newly created one and the combining firms in the merger are dissolved. 
 
 According to Nakamura (2005) merger by absorption could be considered as a de facto 
acquisition. Besides, Gaughan (2002) refers that the term “consolidation” could be used to imply a 
merger by establishment. 
 
2.2 – Types of M&A  
 
 
We can find in literature from M&A several types and classifications, depending of the rational, 
structure of the deals, but it is appropriate to state about this topic the following classification: 
 
M&A Classification by Nature 








Source: Hoang, 2007  
 
Being the types by relationship and economic area more straightforward in terms of understanding, 
and this thesis is focused on a transaction valuation in which the main drivers are the value 
creation, the most common types on this classification are the following ones: 
 
- Horizontal M&A – the acquiring and the target companies are competing firms in the same 
industry. According to Chen and Findlay, 2003, horizontal M&A has growing rapidly over 
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recent years due to global restructuring of many industries in response to technological 
changes and increase competition; 
- Vertical M&A – are combinations of firms in client-supplier or buyer-seller relationships. 
The firms involved seek to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs by upstream or 
downstream linkages in the supply chain and to benefit from economies of scope; 
- Conglomerate M&A – attempt to diversify risks and attain economies of scope by 
engaging in transactions where involving companies that operate in unrelated businesses. 
 
 
2.3 – Motives for M&A 
 
Mukherjee, Kiymaz, and Baker (2003) suggest that there are as many motives for M&A as there are 
bidders and targets. However, grouping the motives of M&A transactions into various categories is 
often useful.  
 
Some common motives for M&A, pointed out the most of the literature, include: 
 
- Means for firms to grow quickly; 
- Hope to experience economies of scale and scope; 
- A larger firm as a result of a M&A may have a better access to capital market, which better 
leads to a lower cost of capital, i.e., financial benefits; and 
- Anticipated gains which a firm may experience when applying its superior management skills 
to the target’s business. 
 
Nevertheless, all authors, in a broad sense, concur that M&A is driven by many complex motives, 
which can vary from deal to deal and cannot be justified by any single theory or approach. 
 
Although the rational can differ from one M&A deal from another, Brigham and Ehrhardt (2002) 
state that the primary motivation for most mergers and acquisitions is to increase the value of the 
combined enterprise.  
 
Empirical evidence cannot say whether mergers, on average, create value (Mukherjee, Kiymaz, 
and Baker, 2003). Although, several empirical studies supports the importance of synergy as a 
merger motive.  
 
2.4 – The Value of Synergy 
 
Many acquisitions and same large strategic investments are often justified with the argument that 
will create synergies.  
 
Synergy can be defined as the additional value that is generate by combining two firms creating 
opportunities that would be available to these firms operating independently. It is the most widely 
used and misused rationale in M&A (Damodaran, 2005). Those synergies can be classified into to 
operational and financial. 
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Synergy is a stated motive in many mergers and acquisitions. Bhide (1993) examined the motives 
behind 77 acquisitions in 1985 and 1986, and reported that operating synergy was the primary 
motive in one-third of these takeovers. A number of studies examine whether synergy exists and, if 
it does, how much it is worth. If synergy is perceived to exist in a takeover, the value of the 
combined firm should be greater than the sum of the values of the bidding and target firms, 
operating independently. 
 




V(AB) = Value of a firm created by combining A and B (Synergy) 
V(A) = Value of firm A, operating independently 
V(B) = Value of firm B, operating independently 
 
Studies of stock returns around merger announcements generally conclude that the value of the 
combined firm does increase in most takeovers and that the increase is significant. Bradley, Desai, 
and Kim (1983) examined a sample of 236 inter-firms tender offers between 1963 and 1984 and 
reported that the combined value of the target and bidder firms increased 7.48% ($117 million in 
1984 dollars), on average, on the announcement of the merger. This result has to be interpreted 
with caution, however, since the increase in the value of the combined firm after a merger is also 
consistent with a number of other hypotheses explaining acquisitions, including under valuation and 
a change in corporate control. It is thus a weak test of the synergy hypothesis. 
 
The existence of synergy generally implies that the combined firm will become more profitable or 
grow at a faster rate after the merger than will the firms operating separately. A stronger test of 
synergy is to evaluate whether merged firms improve their performance (profitability and growth) 
relative to their competitors, after takeovers.  
 
Another concept must be added to the process: the value of control, being this the incremental 
value that an acquirer believes can be created by running a target firm more efficiently. Therefore, it 
is important at this stage that we keep the value of synergy apart from the value of control, which is 
the other widely cited reason for acquisitions.  
 
By separating out the value of control from the value of synergy, two objectives are accomplished: 
1) we ensure that there is no double counting. For synergy to create value there has to be a further 
increase in return on capital to the combined firm; 2) we can devise strategies for acquisition 
bidding that can differentiate between control and synergy value. 
 
The issue of valuing synergies also point out the subject of the right price for a target firm. In these 
sense, a fair value acquisition would require that the total price be equal to the consolidated value 
with the synergy and control benefits built in.  
 
We can conclude that the acquisition price will determine whether an acquisition is value increasing 
or value destroying to acquiring company’s stockholders.  
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2.5 – Value Creation in M&A 
 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) state that target shareholders gain from virtually every acquisition – a 
result that seems to be unanimously accepted by academics. In a sample of 151 mergers, Dodd 
(1980) finds that target shareholders do not vote against the merger proposal even once. Yet, 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) warn that target shareholders who soon sell the stock received as 
payment earn excess returns, while long-term hold strategies diminish the potential gains. 
 
Sirower and Sahni (2006) analyze a sample of over 300 deals to conclude that the average 
premium paid for targets is nearly 36%. 
 
To test whether value created is sustainable, Loughran and Vijh (1997) track long-term (5-year) 
returns on buy-and-hold strategies from the moment before the deal was announced. They 
conclude that, on average, acquirers earn negative excess returns, but refer also that value 
creation is idiosyncratic - the combination of mode of acquisition and form of payment being 
important drivers, with results that range from value-creation for all intervenient to value destruction 
even for target shareholders. 
 
Bruner (2004) makes a sturdy effort to show that M&A does pay. According to his view, empirical 
studies whose historical period of analysis and sample are not biased, and reach statistically 
significant results, conclude that acquirers usually earn the hurdle rate. 
He sheds light on the heterogeneity of individual deals and how dangerous generalizations can be. 
 
In the figure bellow we can find an extract of Bruner (2004) where he point out some probable 
critical points on M&A related to returns to buyers, that should be observed in any transaction: 
 
The main conclusion is that M&A usually generates positive abnormal results for the combined 
shareholders, suggesting economic value is generated (Bruner, 2004). 
 
The question then becomes how is value going to be shared – knowing the heterogeneity that 
marks these deals, any outcome is possible and depends on how the deal is structured/negotiated. 
 
2.6 – Transaction and Payment Framework 
 
The main deal-structuring issues in M&A are the mode of acquisition and the form of payment. 
Nevertheless, we must take into consideration that the type of M&A and the adequate sources of 
capital are important variables to assess. 
 
At this stage is proper to recover that one of the steps in Acquisition Valuation is to decide on 
payment mechanism: Cash vs. Stock. Damoradoran (2002) stress the following conclusion in 
respect to this: 
 
- Firms which believe that their stock is undervalued and some synergy can be achieved 
(Loughran and Vijh, 1997) will not use stock do to acquisitions; 
- Firms which believe that their stock is over or correctly valued will use stock to do acquisitions; 
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- Not surprisingly, the premium paid is larger when an acquisition is financed with stock rather 
than cash; 
- There might be an accounting rationale for using stock as opposed to cash. We are allowed to 
use pooling instead of purchase. 
 
There might also be a tax rationale for using stock. Cash acquisitions create tax liabilities to the 
selling firm’s stockholders. 
 
When considering the stock for stock exchange, we can assume that: 
 
- Correct Exchange Ratio to use in Valuation = Value per Share of Target Firm (with control 
premium and target-controlled synergies)/Value per Share of Bidding Firm; 
- If the exchange ratio is set too high, there will be a transfer of wealth from the bidding firm’s 
stockholders to the target firm’s stockholders; and also in opposite  
 
Despite of the above, we find in the available literature mixed perspectives of the proper form of 
payment.  
 
For instance, Loughran and Vijh, 1997 states that whether it is a merger or a tender offer, cash 
always performs better than stock enhancing the long-term returns for the acquirer. When a deal is 
paid for with stock, only target shareholders earn abnormal returns, mostly because of the 
significant premium they’re usually paid. Yet, Savor and Lu (2009) have recently added that results 
like these should be interpreted with care: it is universally accepted that stock issues, in general, 
suggest overvaluation and timing ability. Therefore, stock acquirers are likely to be overvalued and 
their stock expected to fall in the long run anyway. 
The authors find meaningful and statistically significant evidence that stock mergers do create 
value, because the acquirer’s stock is usually more overvalued than the target’s assets. They earn 
negative returns, but not as negative as they would have been otherwise.  
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3 – COMPANY PROFILES and INDUSTRY REVIEW 
 
 
In this section we will start perform a characterization of each company involved in the proposed 
transaction, object of this thesis, highlighting is evolution, business activity, and financial 
performance, mandatory to understand much of the rational behind the deal. 
 
Further, we will aim a comprehensive understanding the wind energy sector, driver for the wind 
turbine manufacturing industry, being common to the two companies that will serve also the 
proposal to understand why we are looking to a merger between this two companies as well the 
forecasts performed on the next section of valuation. 
 
3.1 – Vestas Wind Systems 
 
Vestas, the largest supplier of wind turbines in the world, focuses its principal activities on the 
product development, manufacturing, turnkey delivery and maintenance of wind turbine 
installations. The company’s sale of wind turbines is by far its main activity and constituted 88 % of 
its 2011 revenue as sale of services constituted the remaining 12 %. 
 
Vestas was originally a hydraulic crane manufacturer which entered the wind turbine market in the 
oil crisis of the late 1970s. The wind energy market expanded and Vestas entered the US market, 
in which they invested heavily. When tax advantages on wind turbine investments were removed in 
the US in 1986, Vestas was forced to sell off all non-wind -related assets and re-emerge as Vestas 
Wind Systems A/S. In the 1990s, Vestas bought Danish Wind Technology A/S. Germany, Denmark 
and Spain emerged as the major European markets. 
 
Then, Vestas went public on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 1998.The current status of 















Source: Company Information 
                                                 
3 In accordance with the Danish Public Companies Act, section 55, the shareholder disclosed are the ones that have 




At 29 February 2012, Vestas had 180,981 registered shareholders, 
who combined represented 187,029,389 shares, or approx 93 per 
cent of Vestas' share capital. At the end of February 2012, 
approx 41 per cent of Vestas' registered capital was held by the 
company's 50 largest shareholders, including custodian banks. 
Based on the information available as of 29 February 2012, an 
estimated 45 per cent of Vestas' total share capital, including 
shares not registered by name, and was believed to be held by 
shareholders outside Denmark.  
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In 2002, Vestas sold its 40 % stake in Gamesa Eólica, a Spanish joint-venture from 1994. In 2004, 
the Danish rival, NEG Micon, was then acquired. 
 
Vestas, in the recent years, despite its leadership in terms of market share in wind turbine suppliers, 
has been loosing market share decreasing from 19,8% in 2008 to 14,8%
4
 in 2010. 
 
To some extent, Vestas’ falling market share is also a result of the prioritising of Vestas’ executive 
management. Vestas has since 2005 prioritised EBIT-margin, and net working capital as the two 
most important financial goals. The third most important goal, market share, was replaced by 
revenue in 2008, as the original goal of a 35 % market share in 2008 was conveniently dropped. 
The actual figure is much lower, 14,8%. To some extent, Vestas’ focus on profitability has sacrificed 
its superior market leadership. On the other hand, Vestas has become profitable since its 2005 
annual report.  
 
In 2011, Vestas supplied 5.217 MW of wind turbine capacity in more than 35 countries, reaching an 
accumulated delivery of 49.332 MW. The production facilities are distributed in Spain, Italy, 

















Source: Company Information 
 
In respect to its workforce, we can see in the table below that the major share is located to the 
Production Units (48%) and especially in Europe and Africa (62%). 
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Europe and 
Africa
Americas Asia Pacific Total
Production Units 6.871 1.710 2.419 11.000
Sales Units 4.450 1.472 1.759 7.681
R&D 1.283 211 543 2.037
Others 1.514 100 389 2.003
Total 14.118 3.493 5.110 22.721
 
Source: Company Information 
 












Source: Company Information 
 

















In 2011deliberies down by 11% compared to 2010, with a 
considerable decrease in Europe (24%). In the opposite way, 
Vestas had a new all-time-high in Americas with 25% increase 
compared to 2010.  
The lower performance in Asia (18%) is explained mainly by 






















Europe and Africa Americas Asia Pacific 
7.622 9.552 
Vestas records a big order backlog, representing an 
increase in face of 2010, with a value equals to  
9,6 bn EUR. 
 
Reinforced market position in Europe and Americas. 
Customers in the USA pulling the projects from 2013 to 
qualify for PTC. 
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In financial terms, 2011 was a though year for Vestas, with disappointing results: 
 
o First loss since 2005; 
o Share dropped 65%; 
o Preparation for a round of lay-offs that will affect more than 2,000 workers; 
o Abandon of Triple 15 targets established in 2009 (15% EBIT margin, 15 EUR bn Revenues, 
in year 2015) and issue two profit warnings. 
 
The company has forecasted revenues for 2011 of around 7 bn EUR, generating only 5,8 bn EUR, 
being the difference explained among other things to commissioning problems of a new generator 
facility in Germany (impact of 600 million EUR on forecasted revenues). Some bad weather 
conditions, especially in Germany, caused postponement of some deliveries and, by extension, 
recognition of a number of projects. This lower than expected revenues impacted in the gross 
margin, with a drop from 17% in 2010 to 12,4% in 2011. By the other hand, revenues form service 
business rose by 13% to 705 million EUR, with an EBIT margin of 16%.  
 















Source: Company Information 
 
In 2011, Vestas assisted to an improvement of its net working capital, (71) million EUR, 
representing an improvement of 743 million EUR since 2010. This improvement was attributable 
especially to the reduction of component inventories following a make-to-order implementation, 
higher pre-payments and trade payables. This improvement also impacted on the free cash flow 
that rose by 812 million EUR to 79 million EUR. 
 
The recent years of large scale investments in new facilities and technology, not fully utilised in 
2011, being the activity far below the company’s capacity, explain much of the huge decrease of 
the Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) for the (1,3)% in 2011 against the 10,8% in 2010. This large 
scale investments also explain much of the increase in the net debt that rose from (0,29)x of 
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Revenue EBIT
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Therefore the company established guidance ranges for EBIT, revenue and free cash flow to take 
into account the heavy fluctuations characterising these items depending on timing of orders intake, 
production, shipments and final deliveries to the customers. 
 




-of service revenue (mEUR) 850
EBIT margin (%) 0-4
EBIT margin, service (%) ~14
Investments (mEUR) 550
  - tangible 200
  - intangible 350
Free cash flow (mEUR) >0  
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3.2 – Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica 
 
Gamesa, currently one of the top-ten suppliers of wind turbines in the world, focuses its principal 
activities on the product development, manufacturing, turnkey delivery, maintenance of wind turbine 
installations, and development and sales of wind farms. The company’s sale of wind turbines is its 
main source of revenues, representing 82% of its 2011 revenue, as wind farm sales 18%. 
 
Gamesa was founded in 1976 manufacturing and selling industrial machinery in the automotive 
sector and defence. Over the years the company began to focus its business model on the areas of 
renewable energy and aeronautics. This last business area was abandoned after the 09.11 attacks 
through a MBO deal. 
 
In 1994, Gamesa embraces the activity of design, engineering, manufacture and sale of wind 
turbines. To support this business, it was created Gamesa Eolica among with two strategic partners 
for aiming different purposes. Vestas with 40%, served the objective of being the technological 
partner to supply know-how, and the Regional Government of Navarra, with 9%, for the 




The inclusion of the Business Unit of wind farm’s development was performed in 1995, aiming the 
goal of being a vehicle to boost the wind turbine development, through the construction of wind 
farm, taking advantage of the strong push assisted in the Spanish market. 
 
In 2000 several actions took place, being them important milestones for the company’s future and 
current business model. Due to the high level of debt accumulated by the strong pipeline of 
constructed wind farms, over than 1.000 MW, the company started, by this, to develop and sell wind 
farms, excluding the operation from its business model. In this same year, Gamesa performed its 
IPO, being included in 2001 in the benchmark Spanish blue chip index, IBEX 35. 
 
In 2002, the joint-venture with Vestas was dissolved with purchase by Gamesa of Gamesa Eolica’s 
total shares, and assuming the nowadays denomination of Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica. This 
operation allowed Gamesa to start its internationalization strategy and operations. 
 
Gamesa being an absolute leader in Spain, the second market in Europe in terms of installed 
capacity after Germany at the end of 2011, took advantage of this position to sustain its market 
share, being currently in a downward trend specially by two factors: stagnation of the Spanish 
market in the end of 2000’s decade and difficulties in shifting its business activity to the growing and 
emerging market. Currently, Gamesa’s market share put the company in 7
th
 position with an around 
7% of share at the end of 2010
6
. Additionally, in common to all pioneers in this market, Gamesa’s is 
suffering, in terms of market position, by the growing of the entrance of the Chinese players that 
currently have in the top-ten, four manufacturers.  
 
                                                 
5 This joint-venture was limited to the Spannish market. 
6 According to BTM Consult. 
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The company don’t have currently in its product portfolio, any large capacity turbine in commercial 
stage in either the field of onshore nor offshore, revealing a delay in this aspect in comparison to its 
main competitors. According to the current Business Plan of the company, the first turbine for 
offshore will be available on 2012, but 
 
In 2011, Gamesa supplied 2.802 MW of wind turbine capacity in more than 11 countries, reaching 





Source: Company Information 
 
The company production capacity is distributed among 33 facilities, in Spain (21 facilities – 1.200 
MW), USA and Brazil (3 facilities – 1.300 MW), China and India (9 facilities – 1.500 MW), with a 
total annual capacity of manufacturing 4.000 MW. In this sense, from the total 8,000 workers, 60% 
are in Spain, as well as the main production infrastructures. 
The main clients of Gamesa have been, during the growth stage of the company, the main 
operators of Wind Power, more specifically, Utilities and Independent Power Producers (IPPs), with 
a major stake on the first one. Recently, we assist to a growing importance of the IPPs and 
increasing entering of a new type of player who are looking to this sector as a way to seek 
profitability and return on its investment strategy. For instance, during 2010, Gamesa performed 
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Source: Company Information 
 












Source: Company Information 
 
Gamesa's share price has fallen by over 44% during 2011, and is hovering near all time lows and 
following a tendency verified in last years in a clear signal of underperformance. Looking at its 
fundamentals seems that despite of relative good positioning in the wind market as well as 
sustained execution the market is strongly penalizing the shares in terms of its market value. Even 
though, the company market performance is in line, for the same period, with the verified tendency 
of its market benchmark, the IBEX 35. 
 
The Revenues increased between 2010 and 2011 by 10,86% inverting the decreasing tendency 
verified since 2008. This increase is justified by growth in wind turbine sales of around 400 MW and 
wind farms (100 M€). After the big boom of wind power market in 2008 (when Gamesa took 
advantage of its great market power in Spain) the further decrease in revenues are explained, in a 
broad sense, by difficulties in penetrate in growing markets, revealing problems to put in practice its 
internationalization program; 
Despite of the increase in value from 2010 to 2011, we observe a downward trend in EBIT margin 










Iberdrola is the referent shareholder of 
the company, and has been a key 
customer of the company.  
 
The order back log has record an increase of 13% driven 
by Latin America, with 32% of the order volume, and 
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platforms. There were a number of non-recurrent factors included in this margin like part of the 
impact of the cost-saving plan (~5 M€) and close to 30 M€ in stocks provisions for highly obsolete 
components in the balance sheet. 
The Net Financial Debt (NFD) did not surpass in 2011 the x2.0 EBIDTA in line with the guidance 
established for the year, accounting 710 M€. The increase of NFD in respect to 2010, is due to the 
following factors:  
o Wind Turbine Division: 2010 => -405 M€; 2011 => 272 M€ (∆ +677 M€) 
Main justification are related to the investment needs to accommodate the new manufacturing 
international facilities and work in progress of turbines. 
o Wind Farm Division: 2010 => 196 M€; 2011 => 483 M€ (∆ +287 M€) 
The increase of the level of NFD is due to the strong increase in construction of wind farms with 
deliveries expected for 2012. Looking to the evolution of the level of net debt in the recent years we can 
conclude that this business implies a 2-year cash investment cycle. 




EBIT margin (%) 02-04





Net debt (mEUR) 250
Group
Net Financial Debt/EBIDTA <2.5x
Free Cash Flow Breakeven
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3.3 – Industry Review 
 
The global shift towards renewable energy has been driven historically by three powerful factors: 
 
Climate change 
This was the key concern behind policy support in the 1990s (e.g. Kyoto Protocol) and into the 
2000s (e.g. the EU’s 20/20/20 targets
7
). A combination of the global recession and renewed attacks 
on the validity of the orthodox climate science has now driven the issue down in the political 
agenda. However, the recent agreement of the “Durban platform” shows that this factor is by no 






This factor rose to prominence following the 09.11 attacks, which made the Western world concern 
about how much of its energy was imported from regions with strong elements of political hostility 
towards it.  
 
The cost of energy
9
 
Used to be couched in terms of the rising price of hydrocarbon fuels, particularly oil, but recently 
there has been a shift of emphasis towards the falling cost of alternative energy sources (especially 
wind power). 
 
Since the onset of the economic crisis three years ago, the most important factor from the above, 
as been clearly the third. Among other things, the much-publicized fall in the price of wind turbines, 
combined with advances in turbine technology, have caused a significant fall in the cost of wind 
energy over the past two years. 
 
Is important to notice, as we can observe in the figure below, that the stated above is more 
applicable to the onshore wind power, a currently mature technology with large penetration and 
advancement, being in some stage of higher growth the offshore segment. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The European Union has a target of deriving 20% of all its energy from renewable sources by 2020, as mandated by 
Directive 2009/28/EC. For that, the European Union member states provided an Renewable Energy Action Plan containg 
their targets for this purpose. 
8 The 2011 United Nations Climate Change Conference was held in Durban, South Africa, from 28 November to 11 
December 2011 to establish a new treaty to limit carbon emissions. The conference agreed to a legally binding deal 
comprising all countries, which will be prepared by 2015, and to take effect in 2020. 
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Levelised cost of energy (LCOE)
10
 – USD/MWh 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) LCOE model as of Q4 2011 
 In the last years, the total wind power installed capacity, has grow in a strong pace, especially 
onshore, mainly in Europe, where the market reached nowadays a mature stage, being as well the 
“origin” of the pioneers in terms of turbine suppliers. At the end of 2011, the largest market in terms 
of installed capacity in Europe was Germany with around 29 GW. 
 
We can observe in the figure below, that we passed from a modest 1,1 GW of annual capacity 
installation in 1995 to 11,6 GW ten years later, being the average of the last 3 years around 36 GW 
per year. 
 
Wind Power Installed Capacity 
Installed Capacity per Year 










Source: Wind Power Monthly Annual Market Review, March/2012 
                                                 
10 The levelised cost of energy is the price at which electricity must be generated from a specific source to break even. It is 
an economic assessment of the cost of the energy-generating system including all the costs over its lifetime: initial 
investment, operations and maintenance, cost of fuel, cost of capital, and is very useful in calculating the costs of generation 
from different sources. 
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The policy changes that are affecting the developed-world markets are largely negative, while those 
affecting the developing countries are broadly positive. For this we can highlight the following 
changes: 
 
China (47% of global new wind in 2010) 
Permitting of new wind farms is currently proceeding very slowly, with central government consent 
now required for small as well as large projects, with no current possibility to assess if it will have a 
negative impact on long-term installations 
 
US (14% of global new installations in 2010) 
The ability to elect to receive 30% investment tax credit (ITC) in the form of cash grant expires at 
the end of 2011, while the ITC it self and the production tax credit (PTC) both expires at the end of 
2012. The cash grant is highly unlikely to be extended, and there are currently doubts about the 
PTC as well. 
 
Spain (4% of the global new wind in 2010) 
The draft of bill covering subsidies for new wind installations from 2013 cut premiums and reduced 
payments from 20 years to 12,k which can jeopardise, according to Spanish wind association the 
Spain’s 2020 target for wind installations. Uncertainties about the proposal from the new 
government remain. 
 
Germany (4% of global new wind in 2010) 
Reforms on the Renewable Energy act include an acceleration of the annual degression in the 
feed-in tariff
11
 from 1-1,5%, while the “system service bonus”
12
 is being removed from the new 
projects. 
 
France (3 % of global new wind in 2010) 
The new bill of law, Grenelle 2, reforming the planning process, among other things, for wind is 
likely to limit growth in deployments from 2012.  
 
UK (3% of global new wind in 2010) 
The ROC’s
13
 for onshore wind have been cut with effect from 2013. The cut is much less than the 
industry feared, but the UK’s changes of regulatory direction are fast winning it a reputation for 
regulatory risk. 
                                                 
11 Feed-in tariff (FiT) is a policy mechanism designed to accelerate investment in renewable energy technologies. It achieves 
this by offering long-term contracts to renewable energy producers, typically based on the cost of generation of each 
technology. Technologies such as wind power, for instance, are awarded a lower per-kWh price, while technologies such as 
solar PV and tidal power are offered a higher price, reflecting higher costs. 
12 The system service bonus, known in the German market as SDL Bonus, is an incentive to improve the integration of wind 
turbines into the grid, by fulfillment of certain technical requirements. 
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As described above, we can conclude that will be a diminishing enthusiasm for clean-energy, and 
especially wind power, subsidies among EU countries and the US, and, on the other hand, steadily 
growing support for wind energy among developing countries, based on considerations of 
emissions, energy security and, mainly, cost of energy. 
 
A huge stack of growth will come from the offshore segment, which will enjoy strong growth in the 
coming years, as we will further in this topic. However, the offshore wind market has some 
characteristics which are very different to those of the onshore market: 
 
a) The turbine performance risk is currently higher, implying a higher warranty risk for the 
manufacturers; 
b) The Capex/MW is higher, mainly due to the fact that offshore turbines must be engineered 
for very hostile offshore conditions. In order to spread the extra cost through economies of 
scale, new offshore turbines models are much larger than the traditional onshore models
14
, 
generally between 5-7 MW. Currently the cost per MW installed is around 3,5 million €/MW 
for offshore (of which turbines accounts for around 1,4 million €/MW), compared with 
around 1,25 million €/MW for typical onshore project (of which the turbine accounts for 
around 0,95 million €/MW); 
c) The average offshore project is larger – while a 100 MW onshore project is a large 
project by the standards of most countries, offshore projects are often much larger, implying 
a much higher Capex and development risks. 
 
It is also important to analyse how is the status of the dynamics of availability of funds for onshore 
















                                                                                                                                                    
13 Through the Renewables Obligation, British electricity suppliers are now required by law to provide a proportion of their 
sales from renewable sources such as wind power or pay a penalty fee. The supplier then receives a Renewables Obligation 
Certificate (ROC) for each MWh of electricity they have purchased 
14 The common onshore turbines vary from 0,85 MW to 3 MW. The larger ones can reach 5-6 MW.  
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Completed wind asset financings (2008-Q3/2011) – onshore – million USD 
 
 
   Europe, Middle East and Africa         Americas         Asia (out of China) 
 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
 
The figure above shows a strong recovery in financings in 2010, relative to 2009, with a slowdown 
in 2011. The weakest regions in 2011 have been Europe, Middle East and Africa, that can be 
explain by the euro crisis, that could impacted in the flow of capital into new projects, especially by 
the lack of liquidity of the banks.  
 
 















Source: BTM Consult 
 
The market has a clear leader, Vestas despite of being losing market share, and the growing 
importance of the Chinese suppliers, that sustain their growth in terms of their high domestic 
market. Currently they have 4 players in the top ten, accounting for around 32% of the global 
installations in 2010. 
Goldwind  
( C hina) ,  9 ,5%
Enercon 
( Germany) , 7,2 %
Gamesa ( Spain) , 
6 ,6 %
Siemens 
( Germany) ,  5,9 %
U nit ed  Po wer 
( China) ,  4 ,2 %
Ot hers, 17,5%
V est as 
( Denmark) ,  14 ,8 %
Sino vel ( China) ,  
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We can also view this topic in terms of the kind of players and their currently market position. There 
are the so called pioneers (companies like Vestas, Gamesa, Nordex, Enercon), which developed 
the technology since its early stage, that accounts for around 40% of the market share, the so 
called conglomerates (specially large holdings with core businesses in the electrical business which 
entered in the market by acquisition deals, companies like Alstom, Siemens, GE), that accounts for 
around 20% of the market, and the “Locals” (companies which relays their share by the importance 
of their local markets, especially the Chinese players) which accounts for around 40% of the 
market. 
 
Also must be pointed out that in terms of offshore, the market is clearly dominated by two players: 
Siemens and Vestas. The first one has around 50% of the cumulative installed capacity at the end 
of 2011 in this segment, and 80% of the new installations in this year, representing Vestas around 
40% of the cumulative installed capacity in 2011. All other players are developing their efforts to put 
into commercial stage their turbines, as Gamesa an example, putting before their prototypes in 
testing sites. 
 
Several trends can be pointed out for the market in the upcoming years: 
 
1) Little growth in global onshore installations after 2011, with a expected growth of 4% 
 
 









After a strong pace of annual installations, 
especially in the last 3 years, it is expected slow 
growth in the upcoming years. 
 
Accelerator Factors: 
- Demand for electricity will rise; 
- Natural resources are getting more 
expensive; 
- Wind is getting more competitive. 
Inhibitor Factors: 
- Financial crisis limits investments in 
infrastructures; 
- Increasing NIMBYism; 
- Politicians hesitant to support 
renewables. 











2007 2008 2009 2010 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E
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2) The growth in offshore is very strong after 2011, though from a very low base of less than a 1 
GW in this year. 
 
Offshore Yearly wind power capacity added (GW) 
 
 
3) Growth in total Europe installations will be modest in the upcoming years, with many markets 
beginning to be constrained by maturity (most of the best sites have gone), and NIMBYism
15
. 
The biggest slice for growth will come from offshore. 
 
Europe, Middle East and Africa yearly wind power capacity added (GW) - onshore 
                                                 
15 European countries have high population densities, e.g. the UK’s population density is twice that of China and nine times 
that of US. 
+35% 
Accelerator Factors: 
- Traditional markets are keeping 
momentum; 




- Chinese offshore contracts fail to 
guarantee permits, siting, feasibility; 
- Spain and the Netherlands are changing 
attitude towards offshore; 
- Political unwillingness to invest in 
infrastructure. 
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Accelerator Factors: 
- EU 2020 targets are driving demand in 
EU; 
- Eastern European markets are rising; 
- South African market is expected to take 
off 
Inhibitor Factors: 
- Political uncertainty for renewables in 
southern EU; 
- Access to grid in certain regions; 
- NIMBYism. 
 
Source: IHS EER Global Wind Energy Market Forecast 2011-2015, November 2011 
9 , 3
9 , 7
1 0 , 3
1 0 , 1
1 0 , 3
1 1
2 0 1 1 E 2 0 1 2 E 2 0 1 3 E 2 0 1 4 E 2 0 1 5 E 2 0 1 6 E
+3% 
Merger between Vestas and Gamesa 
Page 41  99 
 
4) Total American installations are expected to fall, mainly due to ongoing difficulties in obtaining 
viable Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) caused by low electricity prices and the ongoing 
uncertainties in respect to PTC extension. 
 










- Latin America with great opportunities for 
growth; 
- Coal retirements in the USA and Canada; 
 
Inhibitor Factors: 
- Unclear outlook for a PTC extension in 
the USA; 
- Lower natural gas prices in North 
America; 
- Weak economic growth outlook in the 
USA. 
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5) The Chinese market will remain the biggest market in the world, still with ambitious targets.  
 
Americas Yearly wind power capacity added (GW) - onshore 
 
 
In a long term analysis, it’s important to notice that, especially in European Countries, with the 
current public debt issues, is in place a growing social and economic pressure to force the abandon 
of any kind of incentives to renewable energy, although most of them adopt the European Directive 
2020
16
 that establish ambitious renewable targets. Taking into account the installed capacity in 
2010, 84 GW, these targets represents an increase of over 150% reaching an aggregate total of 
213 GW. In conclusion, for the European market, is expected an annual installations between 12-13 
GW until 2020. 
 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that on the basis of the US’s existing subsidies 
policies, the US could have accumulative total installed wind capacity by 2020 of 92 GW, which 
represents a 129% increase over 2010’s figure of 40 GW. In conclusion, for the US market, is 
expected an annual installations around 5 GW until 2020. 
 
China has a current informal target for wind capacity cumulative installations of 225 GW in 2020, 
which represents a 432% increase of 2010’s figure of 42 GW. Therefore, for this market, is 
expected an annual installations around 18 GW up to 2020. 
 
For the Rest of the World (ROW), is assumed a growth rate out to 2020 which is the same as the 
weighted average for the EU, US, and China. This takes cumulative installations from 28 GW in 
2010 to 89 GW in 2020, an increase of 218%. This implies annual installations of 6 GW. 
                                                 
16 The European Union has a target of deriving 20% of all its energy from renewable sources by 2020, as mandated by 
Directive 2009/28/EC.   
+4% Accelerator Factors: 
- New markets are emerging; 
- China still with high expected targets 




- Financial Crisis; 
- Increased NIMBYism; 
- Politicians are hesitant to support 
renewables. 
 
Source: IHS EER Global Wind Energy Market Forecast 2011-2015, November 2011 
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Going into the supply demand analysis, the figure below clearly shows that the global turbine 
capacity far exceeds demand in 2011, and this situation is unlikely to change in the medium term.  
 
 
Wind turbines discounted production capacity and demand 2008-2014 
 
 
Source: Redburn (demand); Bloomberg New Energy Finance (capacity) 
 
It must be taken into account that the turbine manufacturing is not a process industry, with large 
amounts of capital tied in fixed assets which must be used in a continually base to be economically 
viable. Turbine manufacturing is much more an assembly business, where the capital intensity of a 
turbine manufacturer depending in where its particular plants sit in the value chain
17
. The 
consequence of this is that relatively large amounts of capacity can remain unused with only a 
modest loss of margin. 
 
Any analysis validity in terms of prices in this market always depends in the equation of the 
possibility of the Chinese turbines enter in the Western markets. The most probable impacts are as 
follows: 
 
a) Chinese turbines are very competitive in terms of price and the low price offered by the 
Chinese manufacturers is exploited in the turbine tenders held in the Western developers to 
drive down the pricing of the Western manufacturers, even when the developers have no 
intention of buying the Chinese turbines; 
 
                                                 
17 Examples on this particular issue are blades, rotors, nacelles, gearboxes, generators, towers, electronics, etc. 
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b) Quality is a major issue, an often this is one of the factor take into account as contributing 
to the reluctance of using the Chinese turbines, also considered to the financing parties of 
the projects; 
 
c) Chinese players can supply debt to support a project, with the China Development 
Bank (CDB) agreed in 2010 to lend to the greatest manufacturer (Sinovel) 6,5 bn USD and 
Goldwind 6 bn USD, aiming mainly the support of overseas projects; 
 
d) Chinese manufacturers may find it difficult to compete with domestic supply chain. 
The cost of shipping a turbine from China to a Western Market is around 8% of the price of 
an average 2 MW turbine in the West, which can take off some Chinese cost advantage 
when competing with a domestic supplier. 
 
We can conclude that the Chinese turbines are likely to achieve a steady narrowing of the quality 
gap between them and the Western manufacturers, and that they will retain some degree of cost 
advantage, even if some or most of their production is done locally in the West. These 
developments will involve a steady increase in the competitive challenge presented to Western 
manufacturers, rather than the rapid seizure of a dominant position.  
 
We expect a pricing pressure that will continue to follow a downward trend which leads to a margin 
pressure also by the increase in the raw material prices seen in the last years. 
 
 




Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
 
US Steel Plate Price LME Copper Spot Price 
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Although prices have eased since the economic slowdown, the hunger for resources on the major 
emerging economies will sustain an upward movement. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the overcapacity in turbine manufacturing will continue to put 
downward pressure on Western turbine prices which as fallen more than 20% from the high-point in 
2009.  
Main Conclusions 
a) Some growth for the next few years, with little or no growth, especially for onshore in 
second half of the decade. Taking into account the current economical crisis it is expected 
a downside in European Markets. This will impact negatively the growth forecasts of Vestas 
and Gamesa; 
 
b) Developing markets will grow faster than developed countries. Despite of this fact, the 
global market will maintain the prominence of the established markets of Europe, US and 
China; 
 
c) High growth in the offshore market. Vestas is allocating high resources to the development 
of a 7MW turbine for this segment (almost all the 550 million EUR in the financial guidance 
for 2012) but the experience is a must, and some players like Siemens are well advanced. 
Gamesa will face more difficulties to have a significant role in this segment, with some 
delays in terms of both technological and business development; 
 
d) The downward trend in turbine prices will pressure Vestas and Gamesa margins, pushing 
their efforts towards more efficient production efficiency to be in line with this market trend, 
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4 - Standalone Valuation 
 
4.1 – Vestas Wind Systems 
 
We will start the task of performing the standalone valuation of the firm, by establish the appropriate 
estimates of the main items used on the further methods: 
 
a) Sales and Revenues 
 
REVENUE MODEL
Year end Dec 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Deliveries (MW) 4.764 5.842 5.217 7.165 6.277 7.399
Growth -15% 23% -11% 37% -12% 18%
Average selling price (ASP) 0,96 1,08 0,98 0,94 0,9 0,89
Equipment sales 4.575 6.297 5.131 6.735 5.649 6.585
Growth -17% 38% -19% 31% -16% 17%
Global Solutions and Service 504 623 705 850 920 1.005
Growth 27% 24% 13% 21% 8% 9%
Consolidated group sales 5.079 6.920 5.836 7.585 6.569 7.590
Growth 27% 36% -16% 30% -13% 16%
Source: Company information; own estimations
values in mEUR
 
Vestas operates with three types of orders and the order type is paramount for timing of revenues 
recognition: 
 
 Supply only: Vestas supplies only the turbines and the project developer conducts the civil 
works, installation and commissioning of the wind farm; 
 
 Supply and installation: Vestas supplies and installs the turbines but has no responsibility for 
civil works and commissioning, 
 
 EPC (engineering, procurement and construction), also known as turnkey: Vestas delivers a 
complete wind project including commissioning to the customer. This is the most complex order 
type and contains the highest operational risk. 
 
Due to the accounting principles (IFRIC 15) implemented by Vestas, the company cannot recognize 
revenue for supply-only and supply-and-installation order types until the projects have been legally 
delivered and TOR (transfer of risk) has been made to the customer. For EPC contracts, Vestas 
recognizes revenues according to the percentage of completion of he project. 
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b) Wind Turbine Pricing 
 
In the early section, more precisely the industry review was concluded that the intense industry 
competition and the ongoing turbine price deflation contribute largely to the trend of ASP (Average 
Selling Price) reduction. 
 
Therefore, the revenues forecasts reflect the described competitive environment with a progressive 
decline of around 10% on new equipment.  
 
Due to the strong impact on the revenue model, this item suggests some comments on Vestas’s 
turbine pricing: 
 
a) the achieved pricing of almost EUR1,08m/MW delivered in 2010 included UK offshore 
deliveries, which carry an higher price than onshore, and also almost 1 GW of Chinese 
deliveries, which weigh on the ASP; 
 
b) In 2011, the 9% ASP slide, among other things can be explained by the lack of offshore 
capacity in the mix. Notably, Chinese deliveries were roughly half the level in 2010; 
 
 
c) In China, pricing is very low. Its realistic to believe that Vestas’s pricing is slightly higher 
than the average in China. This contributed to the significant backdrop o new orders signed 
in the Chinese market in 2011 (370 MW in 2011 against 973 MW in 2010). In this sense, 




d) Pricing in the European markets remains firmer than in the US and Asia, partly because of 
stronger policy support and higher fossil fuel prices. Thus, Vestas should be able to 















                                                 
18
 According to Vestas’s CEO Ditlev Engel, in FY 2011 results call. 
19
 According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance price index. 
Merger between Vestas and Gamesa 
Page 48  99 
c) Margin Outlook 
 
EARNINGS and MARGINS
Year end Dec 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Sales 5.079 6.920 5.836 7.585 6.569 7.590
Production costs 4.243 5.745 5.111 6.523 5.641 6.431
Gross profit 836 1.175 725 1.062 928 1.159
Gross profit margin 16,5% 17,0% 12,4% 14,0% 14,1% 15,3%
R&D 92 150 203 304 324 320
R&D/sales 1,8% 2,2% 3,5% 4,0% 4,9% 4,2%
Sales & distribution costs 178 206 208 200 176 197
Sales & distribution costs/sales 3,5% 3,0% 3,6% 2,6% 2,7% 2,6%
Administration costs 315 351 352 330 294 295
Administration costs/sales 6,2% 5,1% 6,0% 4,4% 4,5% 3,9%
EBIDTA 469 684 305 643 622 864
EBIDTA margin 9,2% 9,9% 5,2% 8,5% 9,5% 11,4%
Non-recurring costs 0 158 22 50 0 0
EBIT 251 310 -60 178 134 346
EBIT margin 4,9% 4,5% -1,0% 2,3% 2,0% 4,6%




In January 2012, Vestas announced its plans for an organizational reorganization, including 
expansion of the executive management from two to six members and a redundancy program 
totaling 2,335 employees, primarily in the European organization. 
 
Vestas expects to save at least EUR150m, with full cash effect by end-2012, of which the 
redundancies constitute by far the vast majority. Although, by being easy to announce and difficult 
to implement, the following was considered in respect to this topic: 
 
- Vestas did not achieve production optimization measures worth EUR41m according to 
schedule in 2011. Such “cost-out” savings initiatives are part of the usual production flow 
optimization in industrial companies when launching new products (the launching of two 
new models V100 and V112). Therefore, reflecting the timing uncertainty associated with 
such “cost-out” effects, illustrated by the 2011 miss, were not considered in the forecasts of 
2012 any additional cost-out; 
- However, increasing R&D amortization and high cash cost R&D counterbalances more 
than half the expected savings from redundancies and cost-out initiatives due to completion 
of development programs. 
 
In the table below is expressed the forecasts for the impacts of the cost savings. It’s assumed, 
allocating lower staff costs, a half-year effect in 2012 and a full year effect from 2013 onward. 
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COST REDUCTIONS FROM ANNOUNCED EMPLOYEE REDUCTIONS AND COST-OU INICIATIVES
Item (values in EURm) 2010 2011 2012 2013
Aggregate 
reductions
Production costs 5.745 5.111 6.523 5.641
Research and Development 150 203 304 324
Sales and distribution 206 208 200 176
Administration 351 352 330 294
Operating expenses 707 763 834 797
- Less incremental R&D expenses 733 774
Cost reductions Opex (staff) 30 60
Cost reductions COGS (staff) 0 32




Source: Company information; own estimations
Net EBIT impact from staff reductions and delayed cost out




d) Cash Flow Analysis 
 
The guidance objectives from management established in 2011, reflected free cash flow generation 
rather than giving guidance on the working capital to sales ratio. Among other reasons this was a 
consequence of the company changing its accounting principles, meaning revenue and earnings 
from the vast majority (>90%) of orders executed cannot be recognized in the income statement 
until the entire project has been fully completed and legally delivered to the customer. 
 
This results in cash inflow from milestone payments according to the progress of order execution 
now being accumulated as prepayments in the balance sheet until full legal delivery has been 
achieved according to the completion of project principle. Previously such payments were booked 
continually in the P&L. 
 
This change has had a material positive impact on reported net working capital (NWC) and the 
NWC to sales ratio due to a significant increase in reported prepayments.  
 
Essentially, all other wind turbine manufacturers and component manufacturers are operating with 
significant higher NWC to sales ratio.  
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Consolidated sector W C/sales Vestas (new)
20092006 2007 2008 2010 2011
 
However, such reported working capital requirements are posted under accounting principles 
allowing revenue and earnings recognition according to the percentage of completion principle. 
Thus, customer payments are largely recognized in the income statement simultaneously with 
invoicing. 
 
For Vestas, earnings recognition lags invoicing and this results in Vestas being able to operate with 
a lower reported NWC to sales ratio than its closest peers. 
 
VESTAS'S WORKING CAPITAL EVOLUTION AND FORECAST
















Net working capital/Sales (%)
20092006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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In the table below are stressed the long-term working capital assumptions for Vestas: 
 





Inventories 2,50 40% 146
Receivables 5,00 20% 73
Prepayments 3,33 30% 110
Payables 5,00 20% 73
Other liabilities 16,57 6% 22




Management announced total investments for 2012 of EUR550, split EUR200m for tangible capex 
and EUR350m for intangible capex. 
 
For the period 2012-2013 the forecast of total investments considers around EUR530-550m per 
year before another hike in tangible investments in 2014 related to manufacturing facilities for the 
new offshore wind turbine. 
 
VESTAS'S CAPEX EVOLUTION AND FORECAST (EURm)
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f) Debt 
 
VESTAS'S NET DEBT RATIO EVOLUTION AND FORECAST
















The forecasts reflect a cash outflow of EUR330m by end-2013, resulting in a net debt position of 
around EUR850m at end-2013, corresponding to a net gearing of 31% and a reported net 
debt/EBIDTA ratio of 1,4x. 
 







Euro bond 600 5 Drawn 16-03-2011 Listed in Luxemburg
Revolving syndicated creditr 1.300 5 Undrawn 01-07-2011 Private with 9 banks
Bank loans 305 Drawn
- European Investment Bank 250
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Vestas shares are trading below the previous trough EBIDTA valuation and the P/E valuation has 
only recent recovered from all-time lows, now trading around the valuation level post the Lehman 
Brothers collapse. Moreover, the stock is trading at valuation levels around or below the 2003 
valuation (four profit warnings weighed on the share price in 2002-2003). This clearly reflects a lack 
of investor confidence following the two profit warnings in October 2011 and January 2012. 
 
VESTAS'S 1-YEAR FORWARD EV/EBDTA(x)
Source: FactSet, Danske Markets
 
This work assumes that, due to the announced capacity rationalization initiatives, focusing on its 
structural overcapacity, Vestas should be able to proceed as a going concern without needing to 
raise new equity. Nevertheless, the company should begin to realize gross margin stabilization in 
the period 2012-2014. 
 
Nonetheless, due to the near-term not favorable regulatory environment in southern European 
markets and the US, combined with the ongoing intense competition in the wind turbine equipment 
industry, this valuation assumes that, as well as the other wind turbines manufacturers, Vestas 
should warrant any premium to the pan-European capital goods sector, especially pan-European 
electrical sector.  
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EUROPEAN ELECTRICALS EV/EBIDTA VALUATION
Source: FactSet, Danske Markets
 
 
In this sense, using a relative valuation method, such as multiples, and applying the average 
EV/EBIT and P/E multiples of the European Electricals to the 2014 earnings forecast, which reflects 
the margin recovery of Vestas after implementing the announced structural cost-reduction 
initiatives, reaches a fair value of 8,62-10,34 EUR per share, as stress in the following table: 
 
VALUATION MATRIX 2012 2013 2014
European Electricals EBIDTA valuation 6,9 6,4 5,9
European Electricals EBIT valuation 9,4 8,2 7,4
European Electricals P/E valuation 12,1 10,8 9,7
Vestas valuation range
EV/EBIDTA 18,05 15,38 21,08
EV/EBIT 4,49 1,24 8,62





Current share price (end 2011)
Upside/downside potential
 
Following this estimates, we can see that comparing to the share price at the end of 2011, the 
upside potential is around 12%, even considering the measure implemented to create value to the 
company, after a downgrading trend assisted in the recent years. The valuation using this method 
was pushed to 2014 where is forecasted to be in place all established cost-reduction measures and 
some margin stabilization. 
 
Looking to the valuation matrix above, and considering the 2013 forecasts, the Vestas shares 
seems to be expensive. This fact is mainly due the slump in the US volumes. Based on the 2014 
forecasts of a normalized US market and the implementation of the cost-cutting measures, the 
shares are being traded at a discount. 
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Looking to the peers, and its multiples, stressed in the table below, the EV/EBIT multiple estimates 
for 2014, supports, more less, the value reached in the previous methodology. 
 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014
Gamesa 783 0,4 0,4 0,3 3,7 3,4 3,0 10,9 9,1 7,4
Nordex 316 0,3 0,3 0,3 5,5 4,8 4,2 11,6 9,2 8,5
Suzlon 1254 0,5 0,5 0,5 6,0 4,9 4,9 8,0 6,6 6,6
Simple average 2353 0,4 0,4 0,4 5,1 4,4 4,0 10,2 8,3 7,5









Looking to a long-term assumption using a normalized EBIT margin between 4-5%, despite of 
being far from the Vestas’s medium-term guidance for a high single digit EBIT margin, and using a 
ROIC valuation subject to sustainable EBIT margin assumption, the vale are as follows: 
 
4% 5% 6% 7% 8%
ROIC 7,0% 8,8% 10,5% 12,3% 14,1%
WACC 9,30% 9,30% 9,30% 9,30% 9,30%








As we can see in the outcomes above, the most important conclusion is that the share price is 
highly sensitive to different long-term assumptions of EBIT margin. 
 
Being so, it’s reasonable to verify the relative valuation, considering the company as an ongoing 
concern, and extending the forecasts (exposed on appendix) to a long-term basis and applying the 
DCF valuation method. 
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f
WACC parameters Remarks and Sources
Risk-free rate 4,00% Redburn assumptions, Dec.2011
Market risk premium 4,50% Redburn assumptions, Dec.2011
Beta Unlevered 1,2 Electrical Equipment Unlevered Beta. Source: Damodaran, 2012
Beta Levered 1,5
According to formula [17]:
Cost of Equity 10,75% According to formula [15]: 
Debt Ratio 25% Own assumption
Target D/E 33% Own assumption
Credit Spread 3% Spread Applied to Credit Rating A2 Moody's; A S&P
Cost of Debt 7% Risk-free rate+Credit Spread
Tax rate 28% Applied Marginal Tax Rate
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nº of shares (m) 203,7
Value per share (EUR) 10,75
Parameters
WACC 9,32%
Long-term growth 3% Forecast of global Economic Growth
Source: The Conference Board
Economic Global Outlook, 2012  
 
As we can see, the DCF valuation puts the value per share around 13% higher as the target 
estimated on the relative valuation.  
 
Being the mid-term estimates for the company uncertain in connection with final transfer of risk 
(legal delivery) to the clients, and also the time necessary to align the margins after the cost-
reduction initiatives, it’s more reliable to see the fair value of the company based on the DCF 
valuation methodology.  
 
The company’s guidance (as stated in the company profile) reflects the timing uncertainty in 
accordance with full legal delivery. Vestas’s 2011 performance provides a good example that 
delivery postponements can cause material fluctuations in revenue and earnings recognition. In this 
sense, all forecasts and consequent valuation reflects that the potential upside do not materialize in 
2012 but could de addressed in upcoming years. 
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Mid 160 178 11%
EBIT margin 2,2% 2,3%
Source: Company information; own estimations
 
 




Order Backlog end-2011 (MW) 9.552
For delivery 2013 beyond (MW) 1.622





Potential upside to guidance
High end of guidance 1.147
Low end of guidance 2.647
Source: Company information; own estimations
 
In this sense, we will assume a fair value for the shares of Vestas in 10,75 €. 
 
Issues related to value per share on the transaction perspective will be more largely stressed on the 
transaction valuation topic of this thesis. 
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4.2 – Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica 
 
Gamesa faces in the near future a combination of industry-wide and company-specific challenges. 
Not all are entirely in its control, e.g. the wind energy support in Europe and US.  
 
The main difficulties establishing reliable forecasts for Gamesa include the lower support for wind 
energy in some of the most past key markets of the company in Europe, being the most important 
Spain, and the uncertainty in the US. 
 
Gamesa’s manufacturing overcapacity and the effect of the announced cost savings initiatives and 
the low Emerging Markets exposure are also key factor to take into account in the financial 
forecasts. 
 
Overview of Key Medium-term Opportunities and Threats 
Opportunities Threats 
Volumes 




Development of new product platforms 
 
Profit Margins 
Growing service revenues 
Cost savings 
Volumes 
Averse mid-term regulation: lower renewable 
incentives 
Low natural gas process in the US 
Surplus power generation capacity 







Need for further restructuring costs to adjust 
capacity 
Launch costs of new product platforms 
 
Cash-flows 
Lower customer prepayments 
 
Leverage 
Debt headroom limited (Gamesa: 3.2x net 
debt/EBIDTA) 
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KEY ASSUMPTIONS
EURm 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
P&L
Revenue 3.187 2.736 3.027 3.013 2.668 3.217 3.601
   %YoY -16,6% -14,2% 10,6% -0,5% -11,5% 20,6% 11,9%
EBIT 177 119 131 51 96 109 142
   %YoY -24,1% -32,8% 10,1% -61,1% 88,2% 13,5% 30,3%
   % margin 5,6% 4,3% 4,3% 1,7% 3,6% 3,4% 3,9%
Balance Sheet
Net Debt (excl. Factoring) 283 -199 688 616 309 593 391
   x EBIDTA 0,72 -0,61 1,89 2,26 0,95 1,55 0,87
Net Debt (incl. Factoring) 1.157 544 1.103 896 557 891 726
   x EBIDTA 2,94 1,66 3,03 3,29 1,71 2,34 1,62
Cash-flow statement
Capex 128 139 234 229 216 205 195
FCFE -51 551 -819 44 300 -282 209
Returns on capital
RoE 7,3% 3,1% 3,0% -0,9% 1,3% 1,9% 3,1%
RoCE 6,7% 9,5% 4,1% 1,7% 3,7% 3,6% 4,9%
 
 
a) Sales and Revenues 
 
GAMESA - MW Sold


















2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 
The above forecast of volumes reflects the key assumptions and market challenges described 
above, where can be highlighted some prudence on the PTC scheme in the US and that the 
demand in the Southern European markets – key to Gamesa – remains subdued in the foreseeable 
future: 
 
 Regulation in Spain – indefinite moratorium on new capacity 
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The current regulation is a setback for Gamesa, with Spain historically representing 30-40% 
of its wind turbine sales. Other Southern European countries have followed suit by also 
limiting new renewable capacity (e.g. Portugal). 
 
 Regulation in the US – fiscal consolidation likely later in 2012 a risk 
Sales of turbines in the US have made up 14%-28% of Gamesa’s sales in the 2008-2011 
period. As things stand currently, the odds are now in favor of an expiration of the 
Renewable Production Tax Credit (PTC) scheme in December 2012.  
 
Nevertheless, peers like Vestas have been more vocal than Gamesa about the need for a 
PTC extension. As stress on Vestas’s valuation topic of this work, Vestas warned that it 
may have to dismiss around 1,600 workers at its US factories (~7% of its workforce) if the 
PTC is not renewed beyond 2012. 
 
The revenue model assumes a 4% volume of MW sold by Gamesa in 2012 (3% below the low end 
of Gamesa’s target range) and assume a 7% decline in 2013. 
 
b) Wind Turbine Pricing 
 
AVERAGE SELLING PRICE (ASP) - EURm/MW sold, all in












2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
 
 
Gamesa’s revenue per MW sold is a function of multiples variables: 
 
a) the type of wind turbine sold (e.g. the nominal power of the turbine or the efficiency it can 
attain); 
b) the geographic market in which the turbines are sold; 
c) whether the turbine in question is a “spot” sale or part of a framework agreement; and 
d) the proportion of services revenues, if any, that may be attached to the sale of the turbine. 
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The peak of the company’s revenue per MW was reached in 2010 (EURm1,08/MW) but declined in 
2011 by 5%. Excluding services revenues, Gamesa’s revenue per MW sold contracted by only 3% 
in 2011 (EURm0,92/MW sold). 
 
The forecasts assumes a 2% on-off increase in unit pricing (to EURm1,04/MW “all-in”, or 
EURm0,94/MW excluding services), based on the indication that Gamesa will be booking 
exceptional higher revenues in 2012 from installations it performed in 2011.  
 
Nevertheless, its expected unit pricing to contract in 2013 by 3% (to EURm1,02/MW “all-in”, or 
EURm0,91/MW excluding services). In 2014 onwards it’s expected a recovery based on two 
assumptions: 
 
1) the industry supply/demand balance improves (74% of the company capacity utilization by 
2014); 
2) Gamesa successfully starts to commercialize its offshore turbines. 
 
c) Capacity and Costs 
 
GAMESA'S MANUFACTURING CAPACITY vs SALES




















2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
GW sold GW manufacturing capacity
 
Shifting into new markets requires establishment new supply chains. This demands time and 
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 Manufacturing Capacity 
Gamesa has a nominal capacity
20
 equivalent to 4,3GW, being around 65% effectively 
utilized. 
  
Its main locations are Spain, China, US, India, and Brazil. The forecasts envisage 
Gamesa’s nominal capacity will remain underutilized in the foreseeable future, which is 
suboptimal from an earnings and cash-flow perspective. 
 
However, the company has started to address this issue, being its capacity in Spain now 
45% lower relative to 2009 (1 GW vs. 2,2 GW). Most of its capacity has been transformed 
into Operation & Maintenance (O&M) and component and repair centers. 
 
 Cost Savings 
Gamesa announced 3 cost initiatives: 
 
1) cut the “per unit bill of materials”
21
 by 5% by 2013;  
2) cut its “support functioning cost”
22
 by EURm30 by 2013 (~4% cut); 
3) to “rationalize manufacturing” without quantifying it. It’s expected to include several 
actions, such as cuts in the manufacturing capacity and a reorganization of capacities 














                                                 
20 Nominal capacity includes both internal capacity (i.e. based on assets effectively owned by 
Gamesa) and external capacity (when materials and components are purchased from third party 
desk). 
21 Gamesa refers to “bill of materials” as the cost of the materials and components used in a turbine. 
22 Gamesa refers to “support function cost” as structure costs (fixed costs), mostly personnel. 
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The company operates a largely variable cost-base business. The procurement cost represents 
70% of its cost base. However, its fixed costs (largely personnel) are sticky and hard to address 
over short time horizons if volumes contract. This means the actual savings that the company can 
deliver depends substantially on the turbine it sells in 2013. 
 
d) Investments and Capital Employed 
 
CAPITAL EMPLOYED
Year-end December EURm 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Property, plant and equipment (+) 417 428 452 511 551 572 575
Intangible assets (+) 540 554 618 669 706 730 741
Inventories (+) 784 844 1.116 1.007 840 1.014 1.036
Trade receivables (+) 1.793 1.454 1.881 1.816 1.535 1.763 1.825
Factoring (average position of the year) (+) 596 414 281 280 248 299 334
Trade accounts payable (-) 1.657 1.905 1.947 1.981 1.900 2.027 2.269
Total capital employed (year-end) 2.473 1.789 2.401 2.302 1.980 2.351 2.242
Source: company information; own estimations
 
e) Debt and Leverage 
 
FINANCIAL DEBT
Year-end December EURm 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bank borrowings (non-current) (+) 396 557 941 989 967 1.010 1.060
Bank borrowings (current) (+) 688 257 434 409 409 409 409
Cash and cash equivalents (-) 801 1.013 687 781 1.066 827 1.078
Total net debt (net cash) - narrow definition 283 -199 688 617 310 592 391
Debt from factoring (+) 874 743 415 280 248 299 334
Total net debt (net cash) - narrow definition 1.157 544 1.103 897 558 891 725
Net debt/EBIDTA (x)
- based on narrow definition of net debt 0,72 -0,61 1,89 2,26 0,95 1,55 0,87
- based on broad definition of net debt 2,94 1,66 3,03 3,29 1,71 2,34 1,62
Source: company information; own estimations
 
The level of debt is highly than desired for the current conjuncture: 
 
a) the volume for the period 2012-2015 remains highly uncertain. If the volumes estimated in 
this financial forecast declines substantially (even if we consider this estimates 
conservative), would have huge impact on the cash flows; 
b) on the other hand, if the volumes of demand are higher than expected, Gamesa’s leverage 
may deter it from pursuing more volumes as this requires higher working capital 





Merger between Vestas and Gamesa 






EV/EBIT and P/B are theoretically two suitable multiple metrics for valuing Gamesa. The former 
reflects the varying degrees of capital intensity in the business (except when Capex substantially 
exceeds D&A). The later allow to measure how efficiently capital is being allocated, especially when 
set against the RoE. 
 
GAMESA EV/EBIT
Source: FactSet definit ion and consensus
 
For this valuation, is not considered the near-term multiples a solid tool given that: 
 
a) Consensus forecasts highly differ, like saying too high in comparison to the present 
forecasts in this work; 
b) Is considered that the book value of Gamesa’s equity is overstated (EUR,1,685 at end of 
2011); 
c) There are some uncertainties in respect the wind turbine manufacturing cycle, which 
translates in some difficulties to assess if Gamesa offers a reliable value estimates based 
on near-term earnings forecasts. 
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KEY ASSUMPTIONS
EURm FCT Cons. % Diff FCT Cons. % Diff FCT Cons. % Diff
Revenues 3.013 3.212 -6% 2.668 3.300 -19% 3.217 3.520 -9%
EBIDTA 272 286 -5% 327 331 -1% 382 372 3%
EBIT 51 95 -46% 96 125 -23% 109 156 -30%
   % margin 1,7% 3,0% 3,6% 3,8% 3,4% 4,4%
Profit before taxes -19 36 -153% 29 101 -71% 42 140 -70%
Net Income -15 30 -150% 22 53 -58% 32 76 -58%




Target multiples on future earnings could capture the “option value” of the next wind turbine up 
cycle. 
 
TARGET MULTIPLES APPROACH - EV/EBIT (x)





















2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Gamesa Electricals average
 
As opposed to Gamesa’s own historical multiples, the European Electricals stocks are theoretically 
an appropriate peer group for Gamesa: 
 
a) in the period above, the chances of cuts to renewable incentives by the governments 
looked to be a remote possibility. Currently, the austerity programs, especially in Europe, 
are one of the key aspects of the market (as described in the industry review section); 
 
b) There are a large number of competitors in the industry and returns are now lower; 
 
c) Necessity of a lower CoE in wind. For instance, we assist to the emergence of the US 
natural gas as a cheap rival vs. wind energy. 
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Looking to the historical multiple EV/EBIT of European Electrical stocks
23
 (such as Siemens, 
Schneider Electric, Alstom, and ABB), we reach to a 10x EV/EBIT long-term average.  
 
One of the key assumptions in terms of earnings is assuming that 2013 will be Gamesa’s next 
earnings trough and that 2015 will be its next earnings peak. In this sense, was used the 2015 EBIT 
forecast to reflect the value recognized to Gamesa’s recovery. 
 





Target EV/EBIT (x) 10
Target EV 1.419 5,70
Bank borrowings (non-current) (-) 1.060
Bank borrowings (current) (-) 409
Cash and cash equivalents (+) 1.078
Debt from factoring (-) 334
PV implied debt from operating leases (-) 66
Market value of minorities (-) 1
Investments accounted for using equity method (+) 47
Target Equity Value (end 2015) 674 2,71
Discount rate (WACC 9,3%) 0,70
Target Equity Value (end 2011) 472 1,90
 broad concept of net debt
Target Equity Value (end 2015) 1.028 4,13
Discount rate (WACC 9,3%) 0,70




Market risk premium 4,50%
Beta Unlevered 1,2
Beta Levered 1,5









                                                 
23 It is important to notice that Siemens and Alstom have their wind power division as wind turbine 
manufacturers 
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We assist in the table above to a significant impact of the inclusion of a broad definition of debt in 
value per share (~EURm250, EUR 1/per share). 
 
Due to this is important to establish some comparison to the DCF method despite of the not stable 





nº of shares (m) 248,0





The outcome of value will support the estimation of value using the 10x target EV/EBIT multiple for 
the earnings peak of 2015. 
 
Is important to notice that, applying the narrow definition of debt (i.e. including the 2011 year-end 





nº of shares (m) 248,0





In a future transaction the usage of this out comes must be strongly considered in terms of 
negotiations, or understanding. 
 
In conclusion the range of 2,89-3,1€/per share will be the value support for further transaction 
valuation purposes. 
 
Looking to the market price at the announcement of the proposed transaction in this thesis 
(3.21€/share), this represents a downside potential to Gamesa’s shares of 3.43% in respect to the 
DCF valuation. 
 
This results reflects most of the concerns exposed in respect to the business forecasts. 
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5 - Opportunity for the Transaction 
 
5.1 – History and Status of M&A in Wind Industry  
 
The wind sector has a history of M&A activity related principally to the consolidation of national 
players, technological acquisition and sector/segment entry. 
 
The five largest acquisitions of wind turbine manufacturers in the past were achieved at an average 
of ~1.2 EV/Sales: 
 




EV/Sales EV/EBIT Comment 
Repower Suzlon 2007 3% 1.8x 32x Consolidation 
Multibrid Areva 2007 1.5% 1.1x n.a. Sector entry 
Ecotecnia Alstom 2007 1.5% 1.1x 18x Sector entry 
Bonus Siemens 2004 8.0% 1.3x 14x Sector entry 
Enron 
Wind 
GE 2002 9.0% 0.5x n.r. 
Sector entry; 
Operating loss 
Source: Bryan, Garnier & Co. 
 
Recent press articles referred to Alstom eying to take-over REpower for a consideration of 
EUR1.5bn, i.e. ~1.2x EV/Sales, which is in line with past acquisitions in the segment. 
 
Nowadays, a deal could set a reference price and be a support for a potential wind turbine stocks 
re-rating. In 2011, ZF Friedrichshafen acquired Hansen Transmission a supplier of sub-components 
(gear boxes) for a consideration of ~EUR500m with a multiple of 1.3x EV/Sales, despite its lower 
margins and the fact that it also faced similar industry challenges. 
 
When assessing the fundamental positioning of wind turbine manufacturers, it’s fair to believe one 
should keep in mind that turbines are not commodities. There are tangible differences between 
products and manufacturers than can affect the turbine yield and as consequences the wind farm 
IRR.  
 
The market suggests that are three categories of turbine manufacturers, when considering in terms 
of cost of operation ease of set-up, reliability, quality, etc. Vestas is considered to be in the top-tier, 
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5.2 - Market Environment and Motives 
 
To start describing the most likely scenario of M&A in the wind industry, is important to recover the 
most prominent risks that are making pressure under the key players business: 
 
 A collapse of global co-ordination of greenhouse gas reduction schemes weakening 
sovereign nations’ incentives to reduce further, among other things, carbon emissions, due 
partially to the competitive disadvantages such reductions would impose on a nation’s 
industrial sectors; 
 
 Changes in national regulatory frameworks resulting in weaker support for renewable 
energy, including wind power capacity expansions. The most discussed risk currently is 
additional European governments implementing retroactive tariff cuts and the US potentially 
not renewing the PTC before expiry. This could adversely affect wind power through 
weakened demand for wind turbines and cause investors to require higher risk premiums 
for investments in the wind power sector; 
 
 The availability of wind project financing contracting. We believe it less likely that financing 
will contract, emphasizing our analysis showing that project financing is gradually 
improving, albeit patchy at the regional level; 
 
 A collapse in fossil fuel prices would significantly weaken the ability for wind power to 
approach the LCoE (grid parity), hurting the competitiveness of wind relative to fossil-
fuelled power generation; 
 
 The risk of other CO2 low-emission technologies such as nuclear power, natural gas 
(roughly half the emission levels of coal) and carbon capture and storage gaining a stronger 
foothold within some policy frameworks, e.g. such technologies would probably be included 
in a potential ‘clean energy act’ as proposed in the US Senate; 
 
 Global wind turbine makers suddenly reversing the current trend of expanding 
manufacturing capacity only begin to rationalize capacity in western markets. Such 
development could lead to a significant step-down in turbine pricing, as wind turbine 
manufacturers would be likely to dump price in order to utilize capacity; 
 
 Permanent expiry of the American PTC, without another adequate subsidy or renewable 
energy obligation legislation offering a sufficient substitute to the tax credit, would adversely 
affect the US wind power market.  
 
In face of the above, it’s likely to assume a M&A risk in the wind turbine industry, with the need for 
consolidation, depresses valuations of the key players, and still attractive medium-term prospects, 
as stressed in the industry review. 
 
Improving financing conditions could also be a core M&A driver. The recent sell-off in wind turbine 
manufacturers’ shares has changed the list of potential targets, including all the remaining so called 
“pioneers”: Vestas, Nordex, REpower, Gamesa. 
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The key areas of M&A can be resumed as follows: 
 
a) further consolidation to reduce current over-capacity and margin pressure; 
b) acquisition of offshore capability broadly (i.e. not just turbine hardware specifically); 
c) the possible sector entry through the acquisition of incumbents; 
d) the merger between two key players to consolidate their position in the market an avoid a 
takeover (the case of this work). 
 
5.3 - Gamesa perspective 
 
Any possibility of an M&A transaction involving Gamesa, should be considered in terms of 




 is Gamesa’s large customer and shareholder (19,6%), therefore a key element in any 
M&A equation. Iberdrola makes up on average 20-35% of Gamesa’s revenues (2011: 18%; 2010: 
36%), with a current framework agreement governing their commercial relationship since the end of 
2011. 
 
As per the current agreement, Iberdrola is to purchase from Gamesa at least 50% of the onshore 
turbines it will install between 2013-2022. This framework agreement can also terminate earlier if 
Iberdrola purchases a total of 3,8 GW before 2022. Additionally, this agreement also previews 
“collaboration in offshore opportunities and within the area of maintenance services”. 
 
In opposition to other pure-play listed peers (e.g. Vestas and Nordex), Gamesa has a largest single 
shareholder. However, among other issues, an outright acquisition of Gamesa by Iberdrola has a 
low probability to occur, given their unrelated cash-flows and investment cycles. 
 
But with the recent evolution of the sector (stressed in the industry review section), and the status of 
the industry favorable for M&A, Iberdrola could have a different investment rationale for their 
position in Gamesa. 
 
                                                 
24
 is a Spanish private multinational electric utility company based in Bilbao, Basque Country. 
Iberdrola has a workforce of around 33,000 employees in over 40 countries on four continents 
serving around 30 million customers. Subsidiaries include Iberdrola Renovables; Iberdrola Portugal 
(Portugal), Scottish Power (Scotland), Iberdrola USA (United States), Elektro (Brazil), Electropaz 
(Bolivia), among others. 
Since embarking on its growth and international expansion plan in 2001, Iberdrola has become 
Spain’s largest energy group by market capitalization, the global leader in wind energy and one of 
the world’s largest utilities by market capitalization. 
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Currently, can be stated that Gamesa is a non-core and loss-making business for Iberdrola, with 
Gamesa’s share price decline trend already triggered and impairment charge in 2011.  
 




It’s important to notice that in 2011 Gamesa lost almost 80% of its value on the market, although 
being excessive in terms of its fundamentals, reflects a lot of uncertainties and instability observed 
by investors. 
 
Observing the chart below, we can conclude that Gamesa starts to become a painful investment for 
Iberdrola.  
 
CONTRIBUTION of GAMESA's EARNINGS to IBERDROLA's NET PROFIT 
Source: Company information; own estimations































x% Contribution of Gamesa's earnings to Iberdola's net profit
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Additionally, Iberdrola has big targets for offshore business, especially in UK, and Gamesa is 
already at a scale disadvantage vs. other more consolidated players (e.g. Siemens, Repower, and 
Vestas). A volume commitment with Gamesa would clearly benefit demand visibility, but the 
company is facing some important delays on the launch of its offshore turbines at a commercial 
level. 
 
5.4 - Vestas perspective 
 
Vestas is trading around the all time low, reflecting a lack of confidence of the investors more than 





Source: Danske Markets 
 
The cost-cutting program, distressed in the form valuation, also carries certain risks, as well as a 
potential negative earnings impact from the late US renewal of the Production Tax Credit subsidy.  
 
Additionally to the industry challenges, Vestas presents some operational risks: 
 
a) Not successfully conclude its rationalization program of its manufacturing capacity and employee 
base, failing to implement the announced structural cost savings; 
 
b) A systematic structural flaw in one or more turbine models as required large scale production 
stoppage; 
 
c) Vestas has lost  a significant market share (13% in 2011 against 28% in 2006). 
 
Following this  risks, Vestas could be seduced by a merger opportunity with a turbine maker (such 
as Gamesa), seeking to capitalize that transaction. 
 
Generally speaking if the turbine markers do not continue to address the current supply-demand 
imbalance resulting in a continued intense competitive environment characterized by significant 
manufacturing capacity, or global wind turbine volumes suddenly markedly pickup, this could lead 
to a harsher price decline, having a negative impact on cash flows and the balance sheet. 
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6 - VALUATION OF THE MERGED FIRM 
 
6.1 - Methodology 
 
As the reader can see in the last sections where the companies involved in the proposed merger 
had there standalone valuations based on relative and DCF methods, the main conclusions where 
based on this last methodology. 
 
In this sense, the DCF method is going to be applied to the valuation of the merged entity, with the 
following assumptions and criteria: 
 
a) adaptation of the items until EBIT to a common basis, in order to assess the valued added 
of further synergies; 
b) for the revenues forecasts concern, and assuming that the companies are developing their 
activities in almost the same geographies, the estimations are based on growth and 
business diversification perspective; 
c) The tax rate applied before and after the merger are the same; 
d) The WACC that will be applied for the merged entity will be result of changes in financial 
capacity (issue explored in the financial synergies topic). 
 
In order to reach the value of the merged entity and the necessary inputs to reach a fair value and 
transaction structure, the following steps where undertaken: 
 
1) Valuation of each of the involved firms in the merger standalone, using the DCF method 
(already performed in the previous sections); 
 
2) Estimation of the value of the combined firm, with no synergy, by adding the values 
obtained for each firm in the previous step; 
 
3) Identification and the expect synergies by type (operational and financial), and build their 
effects in the expected cash flows; 
 
4) Determine the value of the synergies by the difference between the value of the combined 
firm without synergy; 
 
5) Determine the contribution of each firm to the estimated synergies in order to serve as 
proxy to the weight of each firm’s current shareholders in the merged firm. 
 
6.2 - Synergy Assumptions 
 
After adding the standalone valuation in the DCF model (as we can see in appendix), the results of 
the merged entity without synergies are as follows: 
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nº of shares (m) 451,7






To follow the valuation of the merged entity, we just need to build on the synergy assumptions and 
plug them in that same model. 
 
It is importance to notice that, at this stage, for simplification proposals, it was used to calculate the 
value per share of the merged entity the sum of the outstanding shares of each company. 
 
In the offer topic it will be exposed the proposed number of shares of the new entity in line with the 




Financial literature defends that cost synergies are the most reliable. As being in the valuation of a 
horizontal merger, this type of synergies assumes a higher weight and result.  
 
Cost synergies usually present fast implementation and perpetual results. However, due to the 
production and structure changes that the merged firm will face, due to technological, branding and 
assets in place, I assume that a great deal of those synergies will start to produce higher impact on 
cash flows from 2014 onwards, like saying 2 years after the merger. 
 
Although, and to support this assumptions is important to remember, as exposed in the previous 
section of this work, that both companies started in 2011 a cost reduction program. 
 
We observe to sources of cost synergies in the merged firm: 
 
a) Cost of production implying a higher gross margin 
 
- Higher bargaining power in negotiating the supply of components to the plants of wind turbine 
fabrication; 
 
- Higher efficiency in fabrication, applying criteria of dedication to the most value added 
specialization: Gamesa current assets to the 2 MW wind turbine segments and Vestas assets to 
higher capacity turbines and offshore; 
 
- Reduction the distribution costs, being the higher geographical coverage allowing a boost element 
for this goal. No need also to maintain two commercial networks; 
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In this sense, the gross margin will become higher than 30% when the merger reaches its stability 
 
b) Operating expenses reduction 
 
- Integration of marketing approaches and converging efforts in costumer acquisition; 
 
-  Workforce reduction especially in the general and administrative areas; 
 
-  Existence of only one brand; 
 
This will represent the highest estimated synergy accounting for an average reduction of 2 points as 




As the literature in finance suggests, revenue synergies are much more speculative in value. In this 
sense, it is hard to estimate their size, timing, and sustainability.  
 
The revenues synergies considered in the model assume the following: 
 
a) The industry is retracting in growth, with a huge battle to maintain the current market share; 
b) The goal for the merger in terms of revenues is to maintain each forecasted revenues of 
each company, struggling to go against the low pace in growth in the most mature markets 
(e.g. Europe); 
c) The merged firm will take advantage of the most important markets and segments of each 
firm and boost the offshore segment; 
d) Probable cannibalization effect resulting from two firms with technological similar product 
will be compensated with the business of development and sales of wind farms coming 
from Gamesa. 
 
In this sense, was assumed a CAGR of 4% for the explicit period, being added a 0.6% coming from 
the growth of the services business segment. 
 
At the end of 2011, Vestas registered around 50 GW of delivered capacity and Gamesa accounted 
for 24 GW. This represents a combined delivered capacity of 74 GW meaning around 32% of the 
total installed wind power capacity in the world. In this sense, the new company will take advantage 
of its huge stake in the market to boost its maintenance services business segment. This will 




- Reduction of double investments. As stress in the company profile, both firms are spending use 
amounts in R&D programs of new turbines, onshore and offshore. The stand alone forecasts 
accounts for an average of 7% of revenues, being a great deal of this value allocated to the 
offshore turbines; 
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The merged company has at the end of 2011 a combined net debt of 1.233 EURm. The targets for 
the D/E are even being 33%, disclosed in the WACC used for DCF method valuation proposals, 
resulting in a debt ratio of 25%. 
 
In 2011, Gamesa presented a net debt/EBIDTA ratio of 3.0 with our forecast of 1.3 in 2013, with 
Vestas, for the same indicator and time frame, going from 1.68 to 1.36.  
 
Therefore, a higher EBIDTA levels with decreasing net debt will allow the combined firm, to 
increase its leverage capacity, contributing also to this its much higher dimension. 
 
In this sense, the model of the combined firm with synergies will assume a debt ratio of 35% 
resulting in the following WACC parameters: 
 
WACC parameters Remarks and Sources
Risk-free rate 4,00% Redburn assumptions, Dec.2011
Market risk premium 4,50% Redburn assumptions, Dec.2011
Beta Unlevered 1,2 Electrical Equipment Unlevered Beta. Source: Damodaran, 2012
Beta Levered 1,6
According to formula [17]:
Cost of Equity 11,20% According to formula [15]: 
Debt Ratio 35% Own assumption
Target D/E 47% Own assumption
Credit Spread 3% Spread Applied to Credit Rating A2 Moody's; A S&P
Cost of Debt 7% Risk-free rate+Credit Spread
Tax rate 28% Applied Marginal Tax Rate
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Despite of the restructuring program ongoing in both firms, the combined firm will need to face cost 
coming from merging the two entities, as well coming from the fact of being horizontal merger. 
 
Financial literature and evidence prove that is no doubt that merging two companies, especially 
developing the same business in the same markets, always entails incremental costs coming from 
their integration. In the case of Gamesa and Vestas, we are dealing with a combined workforce of 
around 30.000 works and 16 GW of installed production capacity. 
 
Although being very hard to estimate, it is very clear that they will incur from 2012 to 2015. This 
somewhat high time length to put in place all the necessary restructuring processes are mainly due 
to transform two similar firms, despite of their different dimensions, into a cost efficient new merged 
firm. 
 
It was assumed a restructuring charge considering the following: 
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a) develop a new common brand; 
b) costs of redundancies elimination; 
c) same supply chain and logistics; 
d) decommissioning of fabrication assets to avoid overcapacity. 
 




2012 2013 2014 2015
% revenues 2,0% 2,5% 3,0% 1,5%




6.3 - Value of Synergy 
 
Going forward with the methodology expressed in the first topic of this section, after listing all the 
synergies expected to occur in the merged firm, and applied them into the DCF model, the following 
outcomes where achieved: 
 
Valuation of the merged firm
Enterprise 
Value
Net Debt Equity Value
Merged firm with synergies 7.562 1.233 6.329
Merged firm without synergies 4.193 1.233 2.960




Taking into consideration the restructuring charge (i.e. the integration costs), that accounts at 
present values for 716 EURm, the difference between the equity values will stay at 2.608 EURm.  
 
Therefore, we can estimate a target equity value for the merged firm of 5.568 EURm, representing 
a potential upside in value from the firm without synergies of 88%. 
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1 Revenue Growth 314 9,3%
2 Gross Margin increase 856 25,4%
3 Operating expenses savings 1.332 39,5%
4 Capex decrease 458 13,6%
5 Financial synergies 409 12,1%
Total Synergies 3.369 100%
6 Restructuring Charge








Clearly, we can observe that most of the synergies come from cost synergies, with the increase in 
margin with less average production costs and operating expenses savings accounting for 65% of 
total synergies.  
 
In a much more mature market, with lower growth rates, the space for revenue synergies is lower. 
Also, the aggressive competition landscape in the wind turbine manufacturers expected in short-
term makes this type of synergy somewhat ephemeral. 
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Therefore, this proposed merger addresses to a high value added from cost synergies that will 
allow the combined firm to compete in a higher level and face the constraints identified in the 
industry. 
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7 - THE MERGER  
 
7.1 - Methodology and structure 
 
In this section the main goal is to define, based on the outcomes of the previous sections, the deal 
structure and the transaction. 
 
After arriving to the equity value of the combined firm with synergies and estimate the value of the 
foreseen synergies by source, in order to reach the outcome for the deal proposal, this section will 
proceed as follows: 
 
a) Assuming a merger by creating a new firm, is important to devise the estimated synergy 
share of each firm in the merged firm; 
b) With the outcomes of the previous step, establish a framework for how much will be 
proposed to the shares of each firm into the new company; 
c) Establish the form of payment, in order to see if will be a cash deal or a stock deal. 
 
7.2 - Sharing Synergy 
 
As stated in the Literature Review section, all the framework of the deal will depend on how much of 
the sources of synergy are specific to each firm involved in the transaction. 
 
The outcomes sharing each of the already disclosed synergy value by source are as follows: 
 
Value Weight Value Weight Value Weight
1 Revenue Growth 314 9,3% 236 75,0% 79 25,0%
2 Gross Margin increase 856 25,4% 642 75,0% 214 25,0%
3 Operating expenses savings 1.332 39,5% 666 50,0% 666 50,0%
4 Capex decrease 458 13,6% 343 75,0% 114 25,0%
5 Financial synergies 409 12,1% 327 80,0% 82 20,0%
Total Synergies 3.369 100% 2.214 65,7% 1.155 34,3%
6 Restructuring Charge -456,6 60,0% -304,4 40,0%
Value of net synergy 1.758 67,4% 851 32,6%
Synergy Value Breakdown








As we observe in the table above, Vestas will have a fair value of around 67% of the net synergy, 
being the share of Gamesa 33% including the contribution of each firm to the integration costs. 
 
7.3 – The Transaction 
 
Taking into consideration the relationship between the market cap at the announcement
25
, and the 
outcomes for the standalone valuation performed, we reach the following conclusions:  
                                                 
25 For the purpose of this work it was assumed 31/12/2011. 
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Vestas 8,44 10,75 undervalued
Gamesa 3,21 3,1 overvalued
 
 
As we can see in the above table, it’s clear that the prospects for the Vestas share have a upside 
potential of around 27%, being the Gamesa expectations slightly (-3%) below the current market 
value. 
 
Coming again to the combined firm with synergies, the value added is massive (88%) point out a 
combined business that will benefit both shareholders. 
 
Facing the results of the previous sections, if considered a common takeover, the maximum price 
that could be paid by Vestas in the probable acquisition of Gamesa could be seen as follows: 
 













Market Cap Equity Value Equity Value with Synergy
110,7%
 
Therefore, considering all contribution to synergies, the premium relative to the equity value of 
Gamesa is extremely high, representing a 110,7% of maximum premium. 
 
Looking to the Vestas Shareholder Value at Risk (SVAR)
26






synergy for paid  Value
==  
 
Therefore, the risk is somewhat high in case of the synergies are not realized, putting at risk 39% of 
the target value for Vestas. 
                                                 
26 SVAR reflects how much of shareholders’ value is at risk if no synergies are realized. 
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As stressed in the last section, most of the synergies are coming up from a jointly developed 
business.  Also considering that, in line with the Literature in Finance, being Gamesa overvalued or 
with limited standalone upside potential, the transaction should be a stock deal. 
 
Taking into account that the proposed deal will be a new company, combing both existing firms, 








In case of an acquisition, as considering a offer by Gamesa shares of 6.53€/share, representing a 
3.43€/share premium over the equity value, would result in a exchange ratio of 77%. 
 
As a conclusion, a fair ratio for each of the existing shares in the new merged firm would be as the 
net synergy share. 
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8 – Conclusion 
 
The proposed transaction will result in a horizontal merger by the creation of new entity, where the 
two involved firms, Vestas and Gamesa. Vestas shareholders would own 67% of the new form, and 
Gamesa’s shareholders 33%. The net synergy coming up in the merged firm accounts for 2.608 
EURm, to be added to a combined equity value without synergy of 2.960 M€. 
 
The main benefits resulting from the deal will be in resume: 
 
a) Better position to compete in a industry that is facing a consolidation trend, by the creation 
of a sustainable and leading player; 
 
b) Benefits resulting from economies of scale; 
 
c) Higher pricing power; 
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APPENDIX 
 
HISTORICAL FINANCIAL DATA and FORECASTS 
 
Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica 
 
INCOME STATEMENT
Year end Dec 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Revenues 2.167 3.820 3.187 2.736 3.027 3.013 2.668 3.217 3.601
EBIDTA 209 326 276 222 230 171 235 270 323
D&A charge and provisions -221 -297 -217 -209 -233 -221 -231 -272 -306
  D&A charges -77 -94 -99 -103 -99 -120 -139 -160 -181
  Provision charges -144 -204 -118 -106 -164 -101 -92 -112 -126
EBITA 133 233 179 135 119 51 96 109 142
Impairment charges 0 0 -2 -16 13 0 0 0 0
Total operating expenses inc. D&A -2.734 -3.588 -3.010 -2.617 -2.895 -2.962 -2.572 -3.108 -3.459
Operating Profit (EBIT) 133 233 177 119 131 51 96 109 142
Financial Income (expenses) -66 -50 -53 -54 -39 -70 -67 -68 -70
  Finance Income 10 26 12 18 15 13 16 16 16
  Finance Costs -62 -62 -59 -67 -81 -83 -83 -84 -87
  Exchange Differences -15 -15 -7 -5 27 0 0 0 0
Loss on disposal of non-current assets 29 -3 -2 -1 2 0 0 0 0
Net Impairment Losses 0 0 -2 -30 -25 0 0 0 0
Associates 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PBT from continuing operations 97 181 122 35 70 -19 29 42 72
Income tax on profit from cont. ops. 25 -2 -7 15 -18 4 -7 -10 -16
Net profit from cont. operations 122 179 115 51 52 -15 22 32 55
Net profit from disc. operations 101 143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net profit for the year 223 322 115 51 52 -15 22 32 55
Minority interest -3 -2 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0
Attributable net income 220 320 115 51 51 -15 22 32 55
values in EURm
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BALANCE SHEET
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Assets
Non-current assets 978 1.053 1.280 1.358 1.413 1.571 1.655 1.710 1.742
Current assets 3.387 2.922 3.632 3.582 4.218 4.139 3.976 4.137 4.473
Non-current asset held for sale 0 89 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Current asset held for sale 0 712 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Assets 4.365 4.776 4.912 4.940 5.631 5.710 5.631 5.847 6.215
Equity and Liabilities
Equity and minorities 1.259 1.508 1.576 1.629 1.692 1.672 1.694 1.719 1.767
Non-current liabilities 858 626 757 888 1.315 1.379 1.359 1.423 1.501
Current liabilities 2.248 2.379 2.579 2.423 2.624 2.659 2.578 2.705 2.947
Non-current liabilities held for sale 0 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Current liabilities held for sale 0 113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Equity and Liabilities 4.365 4.776 4.912 4.940 5.631 5.710 5.631 5.847 6.215
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CASH FLOW STATEMENT values in mEUR
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
PBT 97 181 122 35 70 -19 29 42 72
Adjustment for Cash Flow
D&A and provision charges 221 297 217 209 233 221 231 272 306
Incentive plan 0 0 4 3 4 0 0 0 0
Finance income and costs 65 49 52 52 39 70 67 68 70
Disposal of non-current assets -29 3 2 1 -2 0 0 0 0
Impairment losses 0 0 2 30 25 0 0 0 0
Deferred income 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Changes in working capital 259 -319 -277 439 -850 123 277 -365 59
Change in trade and other receivables 59 -26 -204 330 -551 64 282 -228 -62
Changes in inventories -87 -475 385 -59 -280 109 167 -173 -22
Change in trade and other payables 400 246 -317 248 34 35 -81 127 242
Changes in consolidation method -8 63 -3 0 -1 0 0 0 0
Forex -1 4 2 5 26 0 0 0 0
Utilization of provision -52 -131 -140 -85 -79 -85 -90 -91 -38
Other -52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Operating Cash Flow 612 211 121 770 -481 396 603 16 507
Income tax paid -11 -19 -16 -46 -41 -45 -13 -19 -33
Net cash interest 10 -46 -34 -37 -64 -78 -74 -74 -70
Cash Flows from operating activities 611 146 71 687 -586 273 516 -77 404
Purchase of subsidiaries 0 7 -19 -7 -4 0 0 0 0
CAPEX-intanglible assets -38 -40 -48 -47 -92 -90 -86 -81 -77
CAPEX-PP&E -56 -120 -79 -92 -142 -139 -130 -124 -118
Investments in other non-current financial assets -3 -8 -6 -14 -7 0 0 0 0
Investments in other current financial assets 0 0 0 -10 -3 0 0 0 0
Other 11 81 23 -11 10 0 0 0 0
Cash flow form investing activities -86 -80 -129 -181 -238 -229 -216 -205 -195
Equity issue of subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
New bank borrowings 62 66 525 302 556 500 50 50 50
Dividends paid -37 -56 -50 -10 -5 -5 0 -8 -8
Cash outflows relating to bank borrowings -1 -114 -157 -597 -42 -445 -65 0 0
Acquisition of treasury shares 0 -18 -1 -2 1 0 0 0 0
Cash Flows from financing activities -26 -121 317 -307 511 50 -15 42 42
Changes in cash and cash equivalents 499 -55 258 200 -314 94 285 -240 251
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Vestas Wind Systems 
 
INCOME STATEMENT
Year end Dec 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Net Sales 3.583 4.179 3.828 5.904 5.079 6.920 5.836 7.585 6.569 7.590
Cost of sales & operating costs -3.663 -3.853 -3.511 -5.155 -4.617 -6.180 -5.511 -6.942 -5.947 -6.726
EBIDTA -80 326 317 749 462 740 325 643 622 864
Depreciation 0 -90 -85 -103 -151 -175 -109 -252 -254 -267
EBITA -80 236 232 646 311 565 216 391 368 597
Amortisation -36 -33 -29 -32 -60 -105 -244 -213 -234 -251
Impairment charges 0 0 -1 0 0 -150 -32 0 0 0
EBIT before non-recurring items -116 203 202 614 251 310 -60 178 134 346
Non-recurring items 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EBIT -116 203 202 614 251 310 -60 178 134 346
Financial items, net -42 -31 4 46 -62 -72 -94 -47 -44 -46
Associated companies 0 0 0 0 15 1 1 0 0 0
Pre-Tax PROFIT -158 164 202 660 204 239 -153 131 90 300
Taxes -33 -51 -98 -190 -79 -82 -13 -37 -25 -84
Minorities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Discontinued operations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NET PROFIT -192 113 104 470 125 157 -166 94 65 216
values in mEUR
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CASH FLOW
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EBIDTA -80 326 317 749 462 740 325 643 622 864
Change in working capital -105 474 442 -504 -210 -447 784 -223 -111 -41
Net interest paid -42 -40 0 46 -62 -72 -94 -47 -44 -46
Taxes paid -135 -128 -144 -107 -165 -37 -116 -37 -25 -84
Other operating cash items 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash flow from operations -362 632 615 184 25 184 899 336 442 693
Capex 3.512 -152 -284 -676 -786 -906 -806 -550 -530 -650
Free cash flow 3.150 480 331 -492 -761 -722 93 -214 -88 43
Incr./(decr.) in equity -1.954 46 -37 -71 830 55 -12 0 0 0
Incr./(decr.) in debt -975 -318 -24 -27 228 563 6 0 150 -50
Dividend paid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minorities and other financing CF -84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash flow from financing -3.013 -272 -61 -98 1.058 618 -6 0 150 -50
Disc. Ops and other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cash and other equivalents 135 445 764 162 488 335 375 161 223 216
Other current assets 1.840 2.080 3.112 4.279 4.797 3.740 3.792 4.440 4.179 4.595
Fixed tangible assets 466 490 638 1.030 1.461 1.704 1.898 1.846 1.772 1.855
Intangible assets (incl. Goodwill) 477 478 507 644 812 1.034 1.243 1.380 1.496 1.545
Other non-current assets 166 239 277 212 401 253 381 381 381 381
Total Assets 3.085 3.732 5.298 6.327 7.959 7.066 7.689 8.209 8.051 8.592
Creditors 1.342 2.055 3.488 4.182 4.387 3.004 3.822 4.248 3.876 4.250
Short-term debt 51 11 25 109 12 4 6 6 7 7
Other current liabilities 50 32 73 42 145 24 42 42 42 42
Long-term debt 441 163 125 14 339 910 914 914 1.063 1.013
Other long-term liabilities 239 350 399 393 534 370 329 329 329 329
Total liabilities 2.123 2.611 4.110 4.740 5.417 4.312 5.113 5.539 5.317 5.641
Shareholders' equity (incl. Min.) 962 1.121 1.188 1.587 2.542 2.754 2.576 2.670 2.735 2.951
Total liabilities and equity 3.085 3.732 5.298 6.327 7.959 7.066 7.689 8.209 8.052 8.592
Net debt 357 -271 -614 -39 -137 579 545 759 847 804
Working Capital 448 -7 -449 55 265 712 -72 151 262 303
values in mEUR
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STANDALONE VALUATION 
 
Gamesa Corporación Tecnológica 
 
Discounted Cash Flow Model
Values in EURm 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Stable
Revenues 3.013 2.668 3.217 3.601 3.889 4.200 4.536 4.831 5.145 5.248
COGS 1.928 1.708 2.027 2.251 2.411 2.604 2.812 2.995 3.190 3.254
Gross Profit 1.085 960 1.190 1.350 1.478 1.596 1.724 1.836 1.955 1.994
%revenues 36,0% 36,0% 37,0% 37,5% 38,0% 38,0% 38,0% 38,0% 38,0% 38,0%
SG&A 914 725 920 1.027 1.078 1.152 1.231 1.318 1.359 1.411
%revenues 30,3% 27,2% 28,6% 28,5% 27,7% 27,4% 27,1% 27,3% 26,4% 26,9%
EBIDTA 171 235 270 323 400 444 493 518 596 583
D&A 120 139 160 181 186 192 198 204 210 216
EBIT 51 96 109 142 214 252 295 314 386 367
% of revenues 1,7% 3,6% 3,4% 5,0% 5,5% 6,5% 7,5% 7,2% 7,2% 7,2%
Taxes 14 27 31 40 60 71 83 88 108 103
% of EBIT 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28%
NOPLAT 37 69 78 102 154 181 212 226 278 264
+D&A 120 139 160 181 186 192 198 204 210 216
%revenues 4,0% 5,2% 5,0% 5,0% 4,8% 4,6% 4,4% 4,2% 4,1% 4,1%
-CAPEX 229 216 205 195 176 181 186 192 198 203
%revenues 7,6% 8,1% 6,4% 5,4% 4,5% 4,3% 4,1% 4,0% 3,8% 3,9%
- WC Investment -123 -277 365 59 88 97 104 111 118 121 Terminal Value
FCFF (Free Cash Flow Firm) 51 269 -332 29 77 96 120 127 172 156 2.476




nº of shares (m) 248,0
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Vestas Wind Systems 
 
Discounted Cash Flow Model
Values in EURm 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Stable
Revenues 7.585 6.569 7.590 7.894 8.209 8.538 8.879 9.234 9.604 9.892
COGS 6.523 5.641 6.431 6.473 6.567 6.403 6.659 6.926 7.203 7.419
Gross Profit 1.062 928 1.159 1.421 1.642 2.134 2.220 2.309 2.401 2.473
%revenues 14,0% 14,1% 15,3% 18,0% 20,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0%
SG&A 419 306 295 554 672 1.116 1.064 1.050 1.369 1.410
%revenues 14,0% 14,1% 15,3% 18,0% 20,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0%
EBIDTA 643 622 864 867 970 1.018 1.156 1.258 1.032 1.063
D&A 465 488 518 465 493 512 533 554 576 594
EBIT 178 134 346 402 478 506 623 704 456 470
% of revenues 2,3% 2,0% 4,6% 5,0% 5,0% 5,6% 5,6% 6,0% 6,0% 5,0%
50 38 97 113 134 142 174 197 128 132
28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28%
NOPLAT 128 96 249 290 344 364 448 507 328 338
465 488 518 465 493 512 533 554 576 594
%revenues 6,1% 7,4% 6,8% 5,9% 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 6,0% 6,0%
-CAPEX 550 530 650 538 556 574 593 612 633 652
%revenues 7,3% 8,1% 8,6% 6,8% 6,8% 6,7% 6,7% 6,6% 6,6% 6,6%
Working Capital 151 262 303 316 328 342 355 369 384 396
% of revenues 2,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0% 4,0%
- WC Investment 223 111 41 19 19 20 22 19 16 13 Terminal Value
FCFF (Free Cash Flow Firm) 0 -180 -57 76 198 261 282 367 430 255 267 4.227




nº of shares (m) 203,7









Merger between Vestas and Gamesa 
Page 91  99 
MERGED FIRM VALUATION 
C O M B IN E D  F I R M  V a l u a t io n  (w ith o u t  s y n e r g ie s )  -  D is c o u n te d  C a s h  F lo w  M o d e l
V a lu e s  in  E U R m 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 4 2 0 1 5 2 0 1 6 2 0 1 7 2 0 1 8 2 0 1 9 2 0 2 0 S ta b le
V e s t a s 7 . 5 8 5 6 . 5 6 9 7 .5 9 0 7 .8 9 4 8 .2 0 9 8 . 5 3 8 8 .8 7 9 9 .2 3 4 9 .6 0 4 9 . 8 9 2
G a m e s a 3 . 0 1 3 2 . 6 6 8 3 .2 1 7 3 .6 0 1 3 .8 8 9 4 . 2 0 0 4 .5 3 6 4 .8 3 1 5 .1 4 5 5 . 2 4 8
T o ta l 1 0 .5 9 8 9 . 2 3 7 1 0 .8 0 7 1 1 . 4 9 5 1 2 . 0 9 8 1 2 .7 3 8 1 3 .4 1 5 1 4 . 0 6 5 1 4 . 7 4 9 1 5 .1 4 0
V e s t a s 6 . 5 2 3 5 . 6 4 1 6 .4 3 1 6 .4 7 3 6 .5 6 7 6 . 4 0 3 6 .6 5 9 6 .9 2 6 7 .2 0 3 7 . 4 1 9
G a m e s a 1 . 9 2 8 1 . 7 0 8 2 .0 2 7 2 .2 5 1 2 .4 1 1 2 . 6 0 4 2 .8 1 2 2 .9 9 5 3 .1 9 0 3 . 2 5 4
T o ta l 8 . 4 5 1 7 . 3 4 9 8 .4 5 8 8 .7 2 3 8 .9 7 9 9 . 0 0 7 9 .4 7 2 9 .9 2 1 1 0 . 3 9 3 1 0 .6 7 3
2 . 1 4 7 1 . 8 8 8 2 .3 4 9 2 .7 7 1 3 .1 2 0 3 . 7 3 1 3 .9 4 4 4 .1 4 4 4 .3 5 6 4 . 4 6 7
2 0 , 3 % 2 0 , 4 % 2 1 , 7 % 2 4 ,1 % 2 5 ,8 % 2 9 , 3 % 2 9 , 4 % 2 9 , 5 % 2 9 ,5 % 2 9 , 5 %
V e s t a s 4 1 9 3 0 6 2 9 5 5 5 4 6 7 2 1 . 1 1 6 1 .0 6 4 1 .0 5 0 1 .3 6 9 1 . 4 1 0
G a m e s a 9 1 4 7 2 5 9 2 0 1 .0 2 7 1 .0 7 8 1 . 1 5 2 1 .2 3 1 1 .3 1 8 1 .3 5 9 1 . 4 1 1
T o ta l 1 . 3 3 3 1 . 0 3 1 1 .2 1 5 1 .5 8 1 1 .7 4 9 2 . 2 6 8 2 .2 9 5 2 .3 6 8 2 .7 2 8 2 . 8 2 1
1 2 , 6 % 1 1 , 2 % 1 1 , 2 % 1 3 ,8 % 1 4 ,5 % 1 7 , 8 % 1 7 , 1 % 1 6 , 8 % 1 8 ,5 % 1 8 , 6 %
8 1 4 8 5 7 1 .1 3 4 1 .1 9 0 1 .3 7 0 1 . 4 6 3 1 .6 4 8 1 .7 7 6 1 .6 2 8 1 . 6 4 7
% re v e n u e s 7 , 7 % 9 ,3 % 1 0 , 5 % 1 0 ,4 % 1 1 ,3 % 1 1 , 5 % 1 2 , 3 % 1 2 , 6 % 1 1 ,0 % 1 0 , 9 %
V e s t a s 4 6 5 4 8 8 5 1 8 4 6 5 4 9 3 5 1 2 5 3 3 5 5 4 5 7 6 5 9 4
G a m e s a 1 2 0 1 3 9 1 6 0 1 8 1 1 8 6 1 9 2 1 9 8 2 0 4 2 1 0 2 1 6
T o ta l 5 8 5 6 2 7 6 7 8 6 4 6 6 7 9 7 0 4 7 3 1 7 5 8 7 8 6 8 1 0
E B IT 2 2 9 2 3 0 4 5 6 5 4 4 6 9 1 7 5 8 9 1 8 1 .0 1 8 8 4 2 8 3 7
%  o f re v e n u e s 2 ,2 % 2 ,5 % 4 , 2 % 4 , 7 % 5 ,7 % 6 ,0 % 6 , 8 % 7 , 2 % 5 , 7 % 5 ,5 %
6 4 6 4 1 2 8 1 5 2 1 9 4 2 1 2 2 5 7 2 8 5 2 3 6 2 3 4
2 8 % 2 8 % 2 8 % 2 8 % 2 8 % 2 8 % 2 8 % 2 8 % 2 8 % 2 8 %
N O P L A T 1 6 5 1 6 6 3 2 8 3 9 2 4 9 8 5 4 6 6 6 1 7 3 3 6 0 6 6 0 3
+ D & A V e s t a s 4 6 5 4 8 8 5 1 8 4 6 5 4 9 3 5 1 2 5 3 3 5 5 4 5 7 6 5 9 4
G a m e s a 1 2 0 1 3 9 1 6 0 1 8 1 1 8 6 1 9 2 1 9 8 2 0 4 2 1 0 2 1 6
T o ta l 5 8 5 6 2 7 6 7 8 6 4 6 6 7 9 7 0 4 7 3 1 7 5 8 7 8 6 8 1 0
% re v e n u e s 5 , 5 % 6 ,8 % 6 , 3 % 5 , 6 % 5 , 6 % 5 ,5 % 5 ,4 % 5 , 4 % 5 , 3 % 5 ,3 %
V e s t a s 5 5 0 5 3 0 6 5 0 5 3 8 5 5 6 5 7 4 5 9 3 6 1 2 6 3 3 6 5 2
G a m e s a 2 2 9 2 1 6 2 0 5 1 9 5 1 7 6 1 8 1 1 8 6 1 9 2 1 9 8 2 0 3
T o ta l 7 7 9 7 4 6 8 5 5 7 3 3 7 3 2 7 5 5 7 7 9 8 0 4 8 3 1 8 5 5
7 , 4 % 8 ,1 % 7 , 9 % 6 , 4 % 6 , 0 % 5 ,9 % 5 ,8 % 5 , 7 % 5 , 6 % 5 ,7 %
V e s t a s 2 2 3 1 1 1 4 1 1 9 1 9 2 0 2 2 1 9 1 6 1 3
G a m e s a - 1 2 3 - 2 7 7 3 6 5 5 9 8 8 9 7 1 0 4 1 1 1 1 1 8 1 2 1
T o ta l 1 0 0 - 1 6 6 4 0 6 7 8 1 0 7 1 1 7 1 2 6 1 3 0 1 3 4 1 3 3
0 , 9 % -1 ,8 % 3 , 8 % 0 , 7 % 0 , 9 % 0 ,9 % 0 ,9 % 0 , 9 % 0 , 9 % 0 ,9 % T e r m i n a l V a lu e
F C F F  (F r e e  C a s h  F lo w  F i r m ) - 1 2 9 2 1 3 -2 5 5 2 2 7 3 3 8 3 7 8 4 8 6 5 5 7 4 2 7 4 2 4 6 .7 0 3
F re e  C a s h  F l o w  D is c o u n te d - 1 1 8 1 7 8 -1 9 5 1 5 9 2 1 7 2 2 2 2 6 0 2 7 3 3 .1 9 7
E n te r p r is e  V a lu e 4 .1 9 3
N e t D e b t 1 .2 3 3
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COMBINED FIRM Valuation (with synergies) - Discounted Cash Flow Model
Values in EURm 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Stable
Revenues 10.598 9.237 10.807 11.495 12.160 12.865 13.894 15.006 16.206 15.140
COGS 8.451 7.349 8.458 8.723 9.023 9.391 9.726 10.204 11.020 10.598
2.147 1.888 2.349 2.771 3.137 3.474 4.168 4.802 5.186 4.542
20,3% 20,4% 21,7% 24,1% 25,8% 27,0% 30,0% 32,0% 32,0% 30,0%
SG&A 1.333 1.031 1.215 1.581 1.763 2.161 2.293 2.401 2.593 2.574
12,6% 11,2% 11,2% 13,8% 14,5% 16,0% 16,0% 15,5% 15,0% 16,5%
814 857 1.134 1.190 1.374 1.312 1.876 2.401 2.593 1.968
7,7% 9,3% 10,5% 10,4% 11,3% 10,2% 13,5% 16,0% 16,0% 13,0%
D&A 585 627 678 646 682 643 695 750 810 757
EBIT 229 230 456 544 692 669 1.181 1.651 1.783 1.211
2,2% 2,5% 4,2% 4,7% 5,7% 5,2% 8,5% 11,0% 11,0% 8,0%
64 64 128 152 194 187 331 462 499 339
28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28% 28%
NOPLAT 165 166 328 392 498 482 850 1.188 1.284 872
+D&A 585 627 678 646 682 643 695 750 810 757
5,5% 6,8% 6,3% 5,6% 5,6% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0%
-CAPEX 779 746 855 733 735 708 695 750 648 757
7,4% 8,1% 7,9% 6,4% 6,0% 5,5% 5,0% 5,0% 4,0% 5,0%
-WC Investment 100 -166 406 78 107 117 126 130 134 133
0,9% -1,8% 3,8% 0,7% 0,9% 0,9% 0,9% 0,9% 0,9% 0,9% Terminal Value
FCFF (Free Cash Flow Firm) -129 213 -255 227 338 300 724 1.058 1.311 739 11.690




nº of shares (m) 451,7
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